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BACKGROUND
Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder sentenced to death while represented by a
lawyer without co-counsel, who only a few years earlier had graduated law school, and who had
no experience whatsoever in capital litigation, filed his fourth post-conviction petitions in district
court in 2002. This appeal is from the district court's denial of that petition in which Petitioner
sought relief based on a host of ineffective assistance of counsel claims and prosecutorial
misconduct claims. No court has ever considered the merits of any of ineffective assistance of
counsel claim in this case, nor has any court considered the merits of any of the particular claims
of prosecutorial misconduct raised in Petitioner's 2002 post-conviction petition

ARGUMENT
I.

IN APPLYING IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-2719 TO DISMISS PETITIONER'S
POST-CONVICTION ACTION, THE DISTRICT COURT VIOLATED THE
FEDERAL AND IDAHO CONSTITUTIONS' PROHIBITIONS AGAINST EX
POST FACT0 LAWS.
Respondent argues by way of a syllogism that it is not possible that Idaho Code Section

19-2719 violates the expost facto prohibition:
1.

Procedural changes cannot run afoul of the federal and state expostfacto
prohibitions.

2.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719 is procedural in nature.

3.

Therefore, Section 19-2719 cannot run afoul of the federal and state ex
post facto prohibitions.

As a matter of logic alone, this syllogism is unassailable. Add reality to the assessment,
however, and the syllogism fails because it does not account for those procedural changes which
effect substantive consequences, thereby rendering the procedural change itself an ex post facto
violation. Thus, while it is true that the Supreme Court has written, "no ex post facto violation
occurs if the change effected is merely procedural," Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24,31 n. 12
(1980), some procedural changes are not merely procedural and, therefore, may violate the ex
post facto prohibition.
The United States Supreme Court has held since 1925 that there may be procedural
changes which violate the prohibition against expostfacto laws. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167,
170-71 (1925). As that court recently reminded, Beazell went on to note that "the question of
what legislative adjustments 'will be held to be of sufficient moment to transgress the
constitutional prohibition' must be a matter of 'degree."' [Id. at] 171." California v. Morales,
514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995). The Morales court articulated a test to determine whether a particular
amendment is of "sufficient moment" to violate the expostfacto prohibition:

In evaluating the 1981 amendment, we must determine whether it produces a
sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered
crimes. We have previously declined to articulate a single "formula" for
identifying those legislative changes that have a sufficient effect on substantive
crimes or punishment to fall within the constitutional prohibition, . . . and we have
no occasion to do so here.
Id (footnote and citation omitted). More recently, the United States Supreme Court confronted
just such a change in Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000). There, the change considered was

an increased interval between parole reconsiderations. Whether this clearly procedural change
effected a substantive change which violated the ex post facto prohibition depends, the Court

held, on whether the change "create[d] a significant risk" of making the punishment more
burdensome -there, by prolonging the respondent's incarceration.
Applying Sections 19-2719(3) & (5) to Petitioner's case would unquestionably create a
significant risk of making his sentence more burdensome than if the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act ("UPCPA") were applied. For while those statutory sections contemplate barring
claims not raised within 42 days of the filing of the judgment regardless of petitioner's mental
state in relation to those claims and their waiver, under the UPCPA a petitioner's delay in
asserting claims may be deemed a waiver only if he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
waived the claims. I.C. 619-4808. As this Court has held:
In capital cases, a successive petition is allowed only where the
petitioner can demonstrate that the issues raised were not known or
could not reasonably have been known within the 42-day time
frame. This is in contrast with the UPCPA, which requires waiver
to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. I.C. 919-4908.
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695,701,992 P.2d 144, 150 (Idaho1999). Because the Section 194908 hurdle is significantly lower for petitioners than the Section 19-2719 hurdle, it is more
likely that the Court would reach the merits of Petitioner's claims if he were required to clear the
former and not the latter. This was, of course, the Idaho legislature's expressed purpose in
enacting Section 19-2719, as is clear from the contrast between the statute and Section 19-4908,
McKinney, as well as the legislature's explicitly described purpose. I.C. 919-2719 ("The
following special procedures shall be interpreted to accomplish the purpose of eliminating
unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death sentence.") (italics added). Further, Petitioner's
claims are remarkably strong. The relative strength of his claims show that Petitioner would
likely prevail on their merits and thus obtain a reduced sentence andlor vacation of his

conviction. Thus, not only does the statutory change and purpose in enacting Section 19-2719
allow an inference that the change created "a sufficient high risk of increasing the measure of
punishment attached to the covered crimes" such that it violates the expostfacto clause, the facts
of the instant case compel it. Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. at 250. Because death is a more
burdensome penalty than life, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 US. 399,411 (1986) (plurality opinion)
("execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; . . .death is different."),
applying Section 19-2719 to block a merits review of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of
counsel claims constitutes an expost facto violation.
Respondent argues that Petitioner "cannot complain of a lack of fair notice or prejudice"
because, before his first post-conviction petition was filed, this Court "expressly advised [him]
that his post-conviction proceedings would be governed by the dictates of I.C. 3 19-2719." Brief
at 34. But the essence of the expostfacto clause is that it prohibits "enactments which, by
retroactive operation, increase the punishment for a crime after its commission. Collins v.

Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,42 (1990) (citing Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925))."
Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. at 249-50. Thus, contrary to Respondent's assertion, Petitioner can
and does complain of lack of fair notice and prejudice.
By applying the procedural bars of Idaho Code Section 19-2719(3) & (5) to Petitioner's
case, the court below violated Petitioner's state and federal constitutional rights against expost

facto laws. U.S.Const. art I, 310, cl. 1; Idaho Const. art 1, 5 16.

11.

EVEN IF APPLYING IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-2719 TO THIS CASE DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE STATE AND FEDERAL PROHIBITION AGAINST EX
POST FACT0 LAWS, SECTION 19-2719(5)'s UNTIMELY CLAIMS BAR HAS
NO APPLICATION HERE.
A.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719 Invades the Judiciary's Province,
In Violation Of The Idaho Constitution's Separation Of
Powers Requirement.

Noting that the Court has declared that the UPCPA is "an expansion of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus" and that the legislature "may add to the efficacy of the writ," Respondent asserts
that "it naturally follows that I.C. $19-2719 does not unduly restrict the district court's
jurisdiction in violation of the separation of powers doctrine." Brief at 38. Missing from
Respondent's argument is any authority or other reason to think that Section 19-2719 in fact does
add to the efficacy of the writ. Removing from the courts jurisdiction to hear writs does not
increase the effectiveness of the writ. Rather, it invades the power of the judiciary in violation of
the constitutionally mandated separation of powers.
The sole case relied on for the opposite conclusion by the Respondent and the court
below is Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464, 4 P.3d 1115 (Idaho 2000).
But Kirkland is inapposite inasmuch as it nowhere addressed the interplay between the
legislature's power to limit remedies available to plaintiffs and any constitutional rights vested in
plaintiffs. By stark contrast, Petitioner is constitutionally guaranteed the right to seek a writ of
habeas corpus and Idaho courts hold that this remedy may now be sought only through the
vehicle of a post-conviction petition. This means that the legislature's prerogative to limit
remedies in the post-conviction context is not without constraint. Rather, the limits may not
suspend the writ. The fact that district courts did reach the merits of habeas claims filed outside

the Section 19-2719 time restrictions, demonstrates that the statute suspends the writ in violation
of the constitutional guarantee. Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 229-30, 392 P.2d 279
(Idaho1964) (reversing district court dismissal of successive habeas petition brought ten years
after conviction). In short, while the legislature's express streamlining purpose in enacting
Section 19-2719 may have been permissible, its chosen means violated the separation of powers
constitutional requirement.

B.

Idaho Code Section 19-2519 Violates Petitioner's Rights To
Due Process And Equal Protection Guaranteed Under The
United States And Idaho Constitutions

Applying Section 19-27 19 to Petitioner denied him his fundamental right to fairness in
proceedings concerning criminal convictions. The due process guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits states from infringing fundamental rights unless "'narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest."' Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,721 (1997)
(quoting Reno v. Flares, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). Similarly, the equal protection guarantee of
the Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from either classifying people or applying laws such
that only some individuals may exercise a fundamental right, unless the classification or
application is narrowly tailored to serve some compelling state interest. See, e.g., Kadrmas v.

Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (when law interferes with a fundamental
right, it triggers strict scrutiny review); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886) ("whateve1

. . . the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are applied . . . with a mind so unequal and
oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the state of that equal protection of the laws
which is secured . . . by the . . . [Flourteenth [A]mendment[.]"). Section 19-2719 is not narrowly
tailored to serve any compelling state interest

111.

IDAHO COURTS SHOULD REACH THE MERITS OF PETITIONER'S
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT CLAIMS.
A.

Idaho Courts Should Reach The Merits Of Petitioner's
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims Because Petitioner
Was Represented By The Same Lawyer From Trial, On Direct
Appeal, Through His First Post-Conviction Petition And Appeal,
And On His Second Post-Conviction Petition And Appeals Until
1995.

This Court uniformly and strictly construes Idaho Code Section 19-2719 to provide that
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are waived if not filed as part of the
original post-conviction petition. The reason for this, the Court has repeatedly explained, is that
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should reasonably be known immediately upon
completion of trial.' Petitioner concedes and Respondent acknowledges that the Court has
consistently and strictly applied Section 19-2719 to bar ineffective assistance of counsel claims
in any but initial post-conviction petitions. Brief at 18. Petitioner filed his first post-conviction
petition in 1986, and, in that petition, he did not claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel. Petitioner acknowledges that under clear and consistently applied Idaho
law, his ineffective assistance of counsel claims pressed in his most recent post-conviction
petition are waived. Thus, he agrees, arguendo, with Respondent that under this law, the Court is

Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469,472,903 P.2d 58,61, reh 'g denied (Idaho 1995) ("A
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is also one that should reasonably be known
immediately upon the completion of trial); Paz v. State, 123 Idaho at 759-60, 852 P.2d
1355,1356-57, reh 'g denied (Idaho 1993) (same); Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,419, 825 P.2d
1073, 1075, reh'g denied (Idaho 1992) (same); Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 578,21 P.3d 895,
900 (Idaho 2001); Rhoades v. State, 135 Idaho 299,303, 17 P.3d 243,247, reh 'g denied (Idaho
2001); see also Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286, 17 P.3d 230, reh 'g denied (Idaho 2001) (IAC
claims waived where not raised within 42 days ofjudgment), and Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641,8
P.3d 636, reh'g denied (Idaho 2000) (same); and Porter v. State, 139 Idaho 420,423, 80 P.3d
1021 (2003) (same).

without jurisdiction to grant him relief. Brief at 19.
Respondent, however, suggests a way in which the Court may find that Petitioner waived
his claims with new counsel. Specifically, Respondent suggests that under a new, as yet
unannounced rule, Petitioner has had an opportunity to raise IAC claims through new counsel but
failed to seize it and, therefore, has waived the claims. Brief at 20. Abstractly, this argument
might make sense if the claims had beell somehow held in abeyance until the appointment of new
counsel rather than waived 42 days after the trial court entered its judgment. But no such
abeyance doctrine or law exists in Idaho. Thus, in the concrete context of this case, where
Petitioner's IAC claims were not held in abeyance until new counsel was appointed. Instead,
they were, under this Court's consistent and strictly applied precedent, waived after the IAC
claim went unraised for 42 days after judgment was entered against Petitioner.'
Respondent also acknowledges that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted relief to a
death-sentenced petitioner who, in all relevant respects, was identically situated as compared to
Petitioner. Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523 (9" Cir. 2001). Respondent, however, misconstrues
Hoffman as primarily concerned with issues of federal habeas procedure and their threat to
finality of Idaho convictions and sentences. (A copy of Hofman is attached for the Court's
convenience.) Respondent suggests that the key to Idaho's maintaining control of the outcome of
its cases is the regular and consistent application of Idaho Code Section 19-2719, warning that
when state procedural bars are not applied regularly and consistently, "the federal courts
disregard the bars and capital litigants are permitted to skirt principles of comity and federalism

'Judgment was entered in the underlying proceedings against Petitioner on December 7,
1982.

by raising new claims for the first time in federal habeas petitions." Brief at 22 (citations
omitted). Petitioner is confident that this Court appreciates that, in our federal system of
government, state court judgments necessarily are subject to federal court review. Petitioner is
likewise confident that this Court appreciates that its independence on matters of state law is
protected by federal court review of its rulings implicating federal constitutional rights. Indeed,
this Court may-and it has in some areas-provided Idaho citizens broader rights than allowed by
the federal constitution.
Contrary to Respondent's suggestion that Hoffman is a harbinger of the sky's falling,
nowhere does that decision examine whether Idaho applies its Section 19-2719 procedural bar
regularly and consistently. On the contrary, the court expressly found "that Hoffman's
ineffective assistance of counsel claims are procedurally defaulted under Idaho Code 5 19-

2719[.JnH o f f a n v. Arave, 236 F.3d at 530. Relief was granted on an entirely different ground.
Specifically, the court found that Section 19-2719 was "an unreasonable restriction on the
exercise of the federally protected constitutional right to counsel and therefore is inadequate to
bar federal review" in the petitioner's case. Id. (citations omitted). The court explained why:

In Hoffman's case, the Idaho Supreme Court held that petitioner's ineffective
assistance of counsel claims were procedurally barred because they were filed
after the expiration of the state's forty-two day statutory deadline. The Idaho
Supreme Court applied the rule despite the fact that Hoffman continued to be
represented by his original triai counsel during the forty-two day period. . . .In
Hoffman's case, the application of 3 19-2719, which at that time did not provide
for the appointment of independent counsel, permitted trial counsel to continue to
represent him during post-conviction proceedings, which they did. As a result,
Hoffman was deprived of counsel who could review the record objectively for
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Not surprisingly, Hoffman's trial counsel
failed to raise and argue the issue of their own ineffectiveness in post-conviction
proceedings. The practical reality, recognized by other states that employ the
unitary post-conviction and appellate procedures-and, ultimately, recognized by

the state of Idaho itself-is that it is the rare attorney who can be expected to
contend on appeal that his representation was so poor that he deprived his client of
a fair trial.
Hoffman at 533-34. Petitioner is, as compared to Mr. Hoffman, identically situated in all
relevant respects. Petitioner was "represented by his original trial counsel during the forty-two
day period. . . .As a result, [Petitioner] was deprived of counsel who could review the record
objectively for ineffective assistance of counsel claims." Id As in H o f f a n , Section 19-2719
obstructed Petitioner's exercise of his Sixth Amendment rights.
It is noteworthy as well that, as the Hoffman court observed, Idaho's statutory and court
rule changes make it unlikely that the difficulties found in Hoffman will recur:
Significantly, both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho legislature have since
adopted new regulations designed to prevent this situation from recurring. In
1995, the Idaho Supreme court promulgated Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2, which
requires the trial court in a capital case to appoint at least one attorney other than
trial counsel to represent the defendant in post-conviction proceedings. In the
same year, the Idaho legislature enacted Idaho Code $19-2719A, which permits
the trial court to advise capital defendants that they are entitled to new counsel to
pursue ineffective assistance of counsel claims at post-conviction proceedings.
W o m a n at 534. The court is surely correct in its observation. Petitioner's case predates Mr.
Hoffman's, and it is the last one known to undersigned counsel to present the same issue.
Granting reliefwill have no consequences beyond this case.
Finally, Respondent urges that if the Court does not apply Section 19-2719 in this case to
find that Petitioner waived his IAC claims when he failed to raise them within 42 days of the
judgment being entered in his case, the federal courts will determine that Idaho does not apply
the Section 19-2719 procedural bar regularly and consistently and, consequently, will disregard
the bar and allow litigants "to skirt principles of comity and federalism by raising new claims for

the first time in federal habeas petitions." Brief at 22. However, it could hardly be clearer that in
those cases where an Idaho petitioner's trial counsel represented him and in his first postconviction proceedings and where he has waived IAC claims because he did not raise them in his
that first post-conviction proceedings, the federal courts will not find those IAC claims defaulted
because Section 19-2719 prevents such petitioners from pressing their Sixth Amendment right to
counsel via their IAC claims in post-conviction proceedings. Hoffman. The federal courts
cannot hold both that Section 19-2719 is an inadequate procedural bar in those circumstances

and that Section 19-2719 is irregularly and inconsistently applied because this Court has acted to
correct that statute's Sixth Amendment violation in a very small number of cases, including this
one.
B.

Idaho Courts Should Reach The Merits Of The Prosecutorial Misconduct
Claims Because Defendants Are ConstitutionalIy Entitled To Presume That
The Prosecution Fulfills Its Official Duties, Including Disclosure Duties, As A
Matter Of State And Federal Due Process And Other Law.

Incredibly, Respondent asks this Court to rule that if the prosecution succeeds in shirking
its constitutionally mandated disclosure obligations long enough that the defense loses any
remedy for that misconduct. It does so by ignoring or misconstruing clear Idaho and federal law
This Court has held that, "Defense attorneys are entitled to rely on the presumption that
prosecutors have fully discharged their official duties, including the duty to disclose exculpatory
material." Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641,647, 8 P.3d 636,642 (Idaho 2000) (citing Strickler v

Greene, 527 U.S. 263,284-86 (1999)). More recently, but entirely consistently with Sivak, the
United States Supreme Court held:
The State here nevertheless urges, in effect, that the prosecution can lie and
conceal and the prisoner still has the burden to discover the evidence, so long as

the potential existence of a prosecutorial misconduct claim might have been
detected. . .Ordinarily, we presume that public officials have properly discharged
their of-ficial duties. . .Court, litigants, and juries properly anticipate that
obligations to refrain from improper methods to secure a conviction . . .plainly
rest[ing] upon the prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully observed. Prosecutors'
dishonest conduct or unwarranted concealment should attract no judicial
approbation.

Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668,696 (2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Respondent
contends that Banks is limited to questions of procedure in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
While Banks does address those procedural questions, its rulings are hardly limited to them. "A
rule thus declaring 'prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek,' is not tenable in a system
constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process." Id. at 696.
Respondent's contention that Petitioner has no remedy for the prosecutorial misconduct
discovered in post-conviction proceedings flies in the face of these clear pronouncements of state
and federal law. Where a conflict exists between the constitutional right to due process and a
state procedural statute such as Idaho Code Section 19-2719, the constitutional right trumps the
statute. However. Petitioner does not contend that the Court need strike Section 19-2719 as
unconstitutional or rule its bars inapplicable in this case on due process grounds. Rather, it need
merely hold that where the prosecution fails to meet its constitutionally mandated disclosure
obligations, it cannot be said that defendants "reasonably should have known" claims arising
from the undisclosed material.

For all tlzeso reasons and for ail tlre reasons in Appellant's Opening Brief, eonsidefad
individually and severally, this Court should reversc the lower court's suinmary dismissal. The
Court should remand this matter for an ovidentiary hearing on the merits of each claim raised.
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A
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EXHIBIT

236 F.3d 523
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PHoffman v. Arave
C.A.9 (Idaho),2001.
United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit.
Maxwell HOFFMAN, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
A.J. ARAVE, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 99-99002.
Argued and Submitted Sept. 15,2000
Filed Jan. 3,2001
After his murder conviction and death sentence
were upheld on direct appeal, 123 Idaho 638,
851 P.2d 934, petitioner sought federal habeas
corpus relief. The United States District Court
for the District of Idaho, B. Lynn Winmill, Chief
Judge, 973 F.Supp. 1152 and 73 F.Supp.2d
1192.denied relief. Petitioner appealed. The
Court of Appeals, per Preeerson, Circuit Judge,
held that: (1) Idaho statute imposing 42-day
deadline on capital defendants' postconviction
and direct appeal claims was not adequate to
foreclose federal habeas review of petitioner's
ineffective assistance of counsel claims; (2)
petitioner was entitled to evidentiary hearing on
ineffective assistance of counsel claims; (3)
Teague nonretroactivity doctrine did not
preclude petitioner's Fifth and Sixth Amendment
claims challenging denial of counsel during
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presentence interview; (4) petitioner's privilege
against self-incrimination was not violated
during presentence interview; (5) petitioner was
denied right to counsel when his requests to
have counsel at presentence interview were
refused; (6) trial court's consideration of
allegedly unconstitutional aggravating factor in
sentencing proceeding was harmless error; and,
p e r w , Circuit Judge, held that: (7) presence
of aggravating circumstance was not element of
capital case to be decided by jury.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
Preeerson, Circuit Judge, concurred separately
in the result with respect to portion of opinion
authored by Circuit Judge m.
West Headnotes
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Most Cited Cases
District court's decision to grant or deny federal
habeas petition is reviewed de novo. 28
U.S.C.A. 6 2254.
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Inasmuch as right to effective assistance of
counsel lies at the very foundation of adversary
system of criminaljustice, habeas courts must be
particularly vigilant in scrutinizing adequacy of
state rules of procedural default which have
effect of barring federal habeas review of claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.

197 Habeas Corpus
-

197111Jurisdiction, Proceedings, and Relief
-

197III(D) Review
1971II(D)2 Scope and Standards of
Review
197k842 k. Review De Novo.
Most Cited Cases
Dismissal of federal habeas claims based on
state procedural default presents issues of law
reviewed de novo.

Habeas Corpus 197 -403
197 Habeas Corpus
1971In General
197I(D) Federal Court Review of
Petitions by State Prisoners
197I(D)5 Availability of Remedy
Despite Procedural Default or Want of
Exhaustion
197k403 k. Invalidity of State
Procedural Requirement; Inconsistent
Application. Most Cited Cases

Criminal Law 110 -1586
110 Criminal Law
1 1 OXXX Post-Conviction Relief
1lOXXX(C1Proceedings
I I OXXX(C)I In General
110k1586 k. Time for
Proceedings. Most Cited Cases
Under Idaho law, ineffective assistance of
counsel claims that were raised for first time
after expiration of statutory 42-day deadline for
claims by capital defendants were procedurally
defaulted. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6; LC. 5
19-2719.

Habeas Corpus 197 -422
197 Habeas Corpus
1971In General
Federal Court Review of
Petitions by State Prisoners
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236 F.3d 523
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197I(D)6 State's Reliance on or
Waiver of Procedural Bar or Want of
Exhaustion
197k422 k. State Court Decision
on Procedural Grounds, and Adequacy of Such
Independent State Grounds. Most Cited Cases
When habeas petitioner raises federal claim in a
manner that does not comply with state
procedural rule, state court may dismiss that
claim as defaulted, and, so long as the dismissal
relies on a state law ground that is independent
of the federal question and adequate to support
the judgment, it will be insulated from federal
review.

161 Habeas Corpus 197 -377
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aHabeas Corpus 197 -374.1
197 Habeas Corpus
In General

1971(D)Federal Court Review of
Petitions by State Prisoners
197I(D14 Sufficiency of Presentation
of Issue or Utilization of State Remedy
1971~374Availability and
Effectiveness of State Remedies
197k374.1 k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
In a criminal case, the test for whether a state
procedural rule constitutesan insuperable barrier
to the assertion of a federal right is whether the
defendant has had a reasonable opportunity to
have the issue as to the claimed right heard and
determined by the state court.

197 Habeas Corpus
197IIn General

197I(D)Federal Court Review of
Petitions by State Prisoners
197I(D)4 Sufficiency of Presentation
of Issue or Utilization of State Remedy
197k374 Availability and
Effectiveness of State Remedies
197k377 k. Delay in Remedy;
Frustration by State. Most Cited Cases
If a state procedural rule frustrates exercise of a
federal right, that rule is "inadequate" to
preclude federal habeas courts from reviewing
the merits of the federal claim.

@JHabeas Corpus 197 -377

197 Habeas Corpus
197IIn General
197I(D) Federal Court Review of
Petitions by State Prisoners
197I(D)4 Sufficiency of Presentation
of Issue or Utilization of State Remedy
197k374 Availability and
Effectiveness of State Remedies
1971~377k. Delay in Remedy;
Frustration by State. Most Cited Cases
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When application of a state procedural rule
operates to frustrate the exercise of a federal
constitutional right, federal habeas courts may
reach the merits of the underlying federal claim.
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Habeas Corpus 197 -403
197 Habeas Corpus
-

197IIn General

pJHabeas Corpus 197 -374.1
197 Habeas Corpus
-

197IIn General

197I(D)Federal Court Review of
Petitions by State Prisoners
197I(D)5 Availability of Remedy
Despite Procedural Default or Want of
Exhaustion
197k403 k. Invalidity of State
Procedural Requirement; Inconsistent
Application. Most Cited Cases

197I(D) Federal Court Review of
Petitions by State Prisoners
197I(D)4 Sufficiency of Presentation
of Issue or Utilization of State Remedy
197k374 Availability and Habeas Corpus 197 -746
Effectiveness of State Remedies
197k374.1 k. In General. Most
197 Habeas Corpus
Cited Cases
Jurisdiction, Proceedings, and Relief
Idaho statute requiring, in capital cases,
197III(C)
Proceedings
consolidation of postconviction and direct
19711I(C)3 Hearing
appeal claims in single petition and requiring
3 97k745 Criminal Cases
such consolidated claims to be filed within 42
197k746 k. Counsel. Most Cited
days of entry ofjudgment effectively prevented
capital defendant, who continued to be Cases
represented by trial counsel during this time, Habeas petitioner was entitled to evidentiary
from timely raising his claims of ineffective hearing to develop factual record for claims of
assistance of counsel, and thus was not ineffective assistance of counsel, where state
"adequate" to preclude federal habeas review of court denied claims without holding a hearing
ineffectiveness claims on grounds of procedural and state supreme court and federal district court
default. U.S.C.A. Consl.Amend. 6; LC..-§ affirmed that denial on procedural grounds, but
state statute underlying procedural default was
19-2719.
inadequate to foreclose federal habeas review.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6; I.C. 6 19-2719.
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Sentencing and Punishment 350H
*1788(3)

350H Sentencing and Punishment
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(G) Proceedings
350HVIII(G\4 Determination and
Disposition
350Hk1788 Review of Death
Sentence
350Hk1788(3) k. Presentation
and Reservation in Lower Court of Grounds of
Review. Most Cited Cases

Sentencingand Punishment 350H -1788(5)

350H Sentencing and Punishment
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(G) Proceedings
350HVIII(G)4 Determination and
Disposition
350Hlt1788 Review of Death
Sentence
350Hk1788(5) k. Scope of
Review. Most Cited Cases
Idaho death penalty statute requires mandatory
review of the entire record for sentencing errors;
all sentencing errors are treated as implicitly
raised, removing the bar of procedural default.
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Habeas Corpus 197 -423

197 Habeas Corpus
197IIn General
197I(D) Federal Court Review of
Petitions by State Prisoners
197I(D)6 State's Reliance on or
Waiver of Procedural Bar or Want of
Exhaustion
1971~423k. State Court
Consideration of Merits. Most Cited Cases
Claim that state trial court's denial of capital
defendant's reauest to have counsel present
during presentence interview with probation
officer violated defendant's constitutional rights
was subject to federal habeas review, even
though defendant did not raise claim in his
state-court appeal, given that Idaho death penalty
statute required mandatory review of the entire
record for sentencing errors, thereby precluding
procedural default of claim.

Habeas Corpus 197 -461
197 Habeas Corpus
Grounds for Reliefi Illegality of
Restraint
197IIIB') Particular Defects and
Authority for Detention in General
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197k461 k. Grounds in General. &LC@
Cited Cases
Once state raises Teague defense to federal
habeas claim, habeas court is compelled to
address applicability of Teague nonretroactivity
doctrine, which generally prohibits courts from
announcing new rules of law in federal habeas
proceedings, before determining the merits of
the claim.

Ilfll Habeas Corpus 197 -461
197 Habeas Corpus
Grounds for Relief; Illegality of
Restraint
197II(B1 Particular Defects and
Authority for Detention in General
197k461 k. Grounds in General. &LC@
Cited Cases
For purposes of Teague nonretroactivity doctrine
generally prohibiting courts from announcing
new rules of law in federal habeas proceedings,
decision announcesa "new rule" if it breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation.

1151Habeas Corpus 197 &461
197 Habeas Corpus
19711 Grounds for Relief; Illegality of
-
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197IICB) Particular Defects and
Authority for Detention in General
197k461 k. Grounds in General. Mosl
Cited Cases
To determine what counts as a new rule, Teague
nonretroactivity doctrine, which generally
prohibits courts from announcing new rules of
law in federal habeas proceedings, requires
courts to ask whether the rule habeas petitioner
seeks can be meaninghlly distinguished fkom
that established by binding precedent at the time
petitioner's state court conviction became final.
Habeas Corpus 197 -508

197 Habeas Corpus
-

Grounds for Relief; Illegality of

Restraint
197II(B) Particular Defects and
Authority for Detention in General
1971~503Judgment, Sentence, or
Order
197k508 k. Death Sentence.
Cited Cases
Teague nonretroactivity doctrine prohibiting
courts from announcing new rules of law in
federal habeas proceedings did not apply to bar
habeas petitioner's claim that Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination applied
during presentence interview in capital case.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.

Restraint
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J
l
7
J Criminal Law 110 -393(1)
110 Criminal Law
-

1IOXVII Evidence
I 1OXVIIiI) Competency in General
110k393 Compelling
Self-Incrimination
110k393i13k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Sentencing and Punishment 350H -280
Sentencing and Punishment
Sentencing Proceedings in General
350HII(E) Presentence Report
350Hk280 k. Counsel. Most Cited

Cases
Capital defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination was not violated
during presentence interview with probation
officer; defendant was advised that he could
exercise right to remain silent during interview
and did not argue that damaging statements he
made during interview were involuntary in
violation of privilege. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
5.
-

1181Criminal Law 110 -1719
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110 Criminal Law
1lOXXXI Counsel
11OXXXIiB) Right of Defendant to
Counsel
1lOXXXI(B\2 Stage of Proceedings as
Affecting Right
1101<1719k. Adversary or Judicial
Proceedings. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 1 lOk641.3(3))
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at or
after the initiation of adversaryjudicial criminal
proceedings, whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.

1191Criminal Law 110 -1720
110 Criminal Law
11OXXXI Counsel
11OXXXI(B1 Right of Defendant to
Counsel
11OXXXI(B\2 Stage of Proceedings as
Affecting Right
110k1720 k. Particular
Proceedings or Occasions in General.
Cited Cases
(Formerly 1lOk641.3(1))
Capital defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attached before trial. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.
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benefit of counsel during presentence interview
conducted by probation officer in preparation for
capital sentencing hearing. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.

1 10 Criminal Law
11OXXXI Counsel
1lOXXXI(B) Right of Defendant to
Counsel
J .7p sentencing and punishment 3 5 0 ~ ~ 2 8 0
110XXXI(B)2 Stage of Proceedings as
Affecting Right
110k1718 k. Critical Stages. Most 350H Sentencing and Punishment
350HII Sentencing Proceedings in General
Cited Cases
350HII(E) Presentence Report
(Formerly 110k641.3(2))
350Hk280 It. Counsel. Most Cited
Once the right to counsel has attached, the Sixth
Amendment is violated whenever the accused is Cases
denied counsel at acritical stage of the adversary Presentence interview in a capital case is a
critical stage in criminal proceedings for the
proceeding. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
purpose of capital defendant's Sixth
Amendment's right to counsel. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.
1211Habeas Corpus 197 -508

197 Habeas Corpus
19711 Grounds for Relief; Illegality of
Restraint
1971IIB) Particular Defects and
Authority for Detention in General
197k503 Judgment, Sentence, or
Order
1971t508 k. Death Sentence. Most
Cited Cases
Teague nonretroactivity doctrine prohibiting
courts from announcing new rules of law in
federal habeas proceedings did not apply to bar
habeas petitioner's claim that he was entitled to

&23J sentencing and punishment 3 5 0 ~ ~ 2 8 0

350H Sentencing and Punishment
350HII Sentencing Proceedings in General
350IIII(E) Presentence Report
350IIk280 k. Counsel. Most Cited

Cases
Capital defendant was denied Sixth Amendment
right to counsel when his requests to have
counsel present during presentence interview
were refused. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
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12fl1 Habeas Corpus 197 -508
197 Habeas Corpus
-

Grounds for Relief; Illegality of

Restraint
197II(B) Particular Defects and
Authority for Detention in General
197k503 Judgment, Sentence, or
Order
1971~508k. Death Sentence. Most
Cited Cases
To be entitled to federal habeas relief based on
denial of right to counsel during presentence
interview in capital case, petitioner had to
establish that error had substantial and injurious
effect on his sentence. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
6.
Habeas Corpus 197 -864(5)
197 Habeas Corpus
-

Jurisdiction, Proceedings, and Relief
197III(D) Review
197III(D)3 Determination and
Disposition
197k862 Remand
197k864 Criminal Cases
1971t864(51k. Sentence and
Punishment. Most Cited Cases
Remand of issue of whether denial of federal
habeas petitioner's right to counsel during
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presentence interview was harmless error was
required for evidentiary hearing as to whether
ineffective assistance of counsel during trial and
sentencing cast doubt over reliability of full
body of mitigating and aggravating evidence
considered at sentencing. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.

1261Habeas Corpus 197 -508
197 Habeas Corpus
19711 Grounds for
-

Relief; Illegality of

Restraint
197II(B) Particular Defects and
Authority for Detention in General
1971~503Judgment, Sentence, or
Order
197k508 k. Death Sentence. Most
Cited Cases
Even if Idaho's aggravating factor that murder
was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel was
unconstitutional, trial court's consideration of
that factor in habeas petitioner's capital
sentencing proceeding did not warrant federal
habeas relief, given that trial court independently
weighed mitigating evidence against challenged
aggravating factor and unchallenged aggravating
factor, and determined that each aggravating
factor, standing alone, outweighed the mitigation
evidence. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 8;
19-2515(h)(5. 10).
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1271

Sentencing and Pnnishment 350H
-1788(5)

Sentencing and Punishment
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(G) Proceedings
350HVIII(G)4 Determination and
Disposition
350Hk1788 Review of Death
Sentence
350Hlc1788(5) k. Scope of
Review. Most Cited Cases

JJf&
5

Sentencing
-1788(10)

and

Pnnishment

350H

350H Sentencing and Punishment
350HVIII The Death Penalty
350HVIII(G) Proceedings
350HVIII(G)4 Determination and
Disposition
350Hk1788 Review of Death
Sentence
350Hk1788(10) k. Harmless and
Reversible Error. Most Cited Cases
Appropriate remedy for reliance upon
unconstitutional aggravating factor depends in
part on whether state death penalty statute is
weighing or non-weighing statute; generally, in
states with non-weighing schemes, reviewing
courts may affirm death sentence if other valid
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aggravating factors remain, while a court
reviewing death sentence imposed under
weighing scheme must conduct constitutional
harmless-exor analysis or require a reweighing.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8.

1281

Sentencing and Punishment 350H
*1788(7)

Sentencing and Punishment
350HVIII The Death Penalty
3501-IVIII(G) Proceedings
350HVIII(G)4 Determination and
Disposition
350Hk1788 Review of Death
Sentence
350Hk1788(7) k. Presumptions.
Most Cited Cases
When sentencing body is told to weigh invalid
factor in its decision as to whether to impose
death sentence, reviewing court may not assume
that it would have made no difference if the
thumb had been removed from death's side of
the scale. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8.

1291

Sentencing and Punishment 350H

-1777
Sentencing and Punishment
350HVIII The Death Penalty
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350HVIII(G) Proceedings
350HVIII(G)3 Hearing
350Hk1777 k. Questions of Law
or Fact. Most Cited Cases
Presence of an aggravating circumstancewas not
element of capital case to be decided by the jury,
but, rather, could be decided by the judge.
"526 Joan M. Fisher, Federal Defenders of
Eastern Washington and Idaho, Moscow, Idaho
and Ellison Matthews, Boise, Idaho, for the
petitioner-appellant.
L. LaMont Anderson, Deputy Attorney General,
Boise, Idaho, for the respondent-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the District of Idaho; B. Lvnn Winmill, District
Judge, Presiding. D.C. No.
CV-94-00200-S-BLW.
Before: PREGERSON, W. FLETCHER and
GOULD, Circuit Judges.

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:
Maxwell Hoffman ("Hoffman") appeals the
district court's dismissal of his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, in which he claims, inter alia,
that the district court erred in finding that: (1)
Idaho Code 6 19-2719 was an adequate and
independent state law ground to support the state
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court'sjudgment that petitioner had defaulted his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims; (2)
petitioner's due process rights were not violated
by the state trial court's refusal. to allow
petitioner's attorney to be present at the
presentence interview conducted by the state
probation officer; (3) the "heinous, atrocious and
cruel" aggravating factor in Idaho's capital
sentencing law, Idaho Code 6 19-2515(h)(5),
was not unconstitutionally vague; and (4) the
application of Idaho's capital sentencing scheme
did not unconstitutionallydeprive petitioner"527
of ihe right to have a jury determine the presence
of an aggravating circumstance in light of
AD-prendiv. New Jersey. 530 U.S. 466.120 S.Ct.
2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000).
This court has jurisdiction to review petitioner's
claims under 28 U.S.C. 66 1291 and 2254. We
affirm the district court's ruling that Hoffman's
ineffective assistance of counsel claims were
procedurally defaulted under Idaho Code 5
19-2719, but reverse on the question whetherthe
Idaho statute is "adequate" to preclude federal
review of the underlying constitutional claim.
Hoffman v. Arave. 973 F.Supp. 1152. 1166-68
[D.Idaho 1997). We also reverse the district
court's finding that Hoffman's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel was not violated by the Idaho
trial court's refusal to allow petitioner's attorney
to be present at the presentence interview
conducted by a state probation official. Ifoffman
v. Arave. 73 F.Suv~.2d1192,1203-07 (D.Idaho
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19981R'" With respect to petitioner's remaining
claims, we uphold the findings of the district
court.?
Accordingly, we affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for an evidentiary
hearing on petitioner's ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.
FNI, The district court issued two

separate opinions with respect to
Hoffman's federal habeas petition. In the
first opinion, the court addressed the
claims which had been dismissed by the
Idaho Supreme Court as procedurally
defaulted. In the second opinion, the
court addressed Hoffman's remaining
claims, which the Idaho Supreme Court
had rejected on the merits.

FN2.In Part V, a majority of the panel,
Judges W. FLETCHER and GOULD,
conclude that Hoffman's Apprendi claim
is foreclosed by Walton v. Arizona. 497
U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d
5 11 (1 990'). Judge PREGERSON does
not believe that Walton precludes the
application of Apprendi to Hoffman's
case. Judge PREGERSON concludes,
however, that the Apprendi error was
harmless and thus concurs separately in
Part v.
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Facts and Procedurai History
On March 16, 1989, an Idaho jury found
Hoffman guilty of first degree murder for killing
Denise Williams, a police informant. At trial,
Hoffman, who is indigent, was represented by
county public defenders William Wellman
("Wellman") and Charles Coulter ("Coulter").
Following Hoffman's conviction, the state
sought the death penalty. Pursuant to Idaho law,
the state trial court conducted a separate
sentencing proceeding, which included a
presentence interview of the defendant by a
probation officer, the submission of a
presentence report written by the probation
officer, and a sentencing hearing held by the
court in which aggravating and mitigating
evidence was presented by the state and defense
counsel. After considering the testimony at trial
and sentencing, and the presentence report
submitted by the probation officer, the trial court
imposed the death penalty.
Before sentencing proceedings began, Hoffman's
trial counsel filed a motion requesting the right
to have counsel present at the presentence
interview with the probation officer, which the
court denied. Trial counsel also filed a motion
pursuant to Idaho Code 66 19-2522(3)(a-R and
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arequesting that the court order a psychiatrist

FN4. The court order states, in relevant
-

or psychologist to examine "the mental
condition of the defendant" and submit a written
report to defense counsel. The court granted the
motion and appointed psychologist David
Sanford, Ph.D., to prepare a written evaluation
of Hoffman and submit it to defense counse1.E
Dr. Sanford prepared a report, in which he
concluded that Hoffman was "illiterate," and
"shows a rather consistent picture of brain
damage to the left hemisphere" that created "528
"significant articulation problems" and an
"overall borderline intellectual capability."
Hoffman's attorneys elected not to present
Sanford's report at sentencing or "make any use
of the psychological findings." 0'74 State V.
Hoffman, 123 Idaho 638, 851 P.2d 934. 937
cert. denied, Hoffman v. Idaho. 5 11 U.S.
1012,114 S.Ct. 1387,128 L.Ed.2d 61 (1994).

part "The Court advised the parties that
defendant will have to decide whether he
wants to use the psychologist as a
witness so that the State can have an
opportunity to review the report." The
court went on to say that if defense
counsel did intend to "use any part of
[Sanford's] report at the time of
sentencing, he will need to furnish a
copy" to the prosecution several weeks
before the sentencing hearing.

m,

FN3. The
-

court ordered that Dr.
Sanford's report include: an account of
the procedures used in the examination;
a diagnosis of the defendant's mental
state; an analysis of whether the
defendant was functionally impaired;
and an analysis ofwhether treatment was
available for the defendant's mental
condition, the risks of such treatment,
and the risk posed by the defendant to
society.

On June 9, 1989, the court held a sentencing
hearing to determine whether Hoffman would
receive life in prison or the death penalty.
Hoffman testified that he had spent most of his
childhood as a ward of the state and some of his
adult life in state penal institutions where he was
incarcerated for burglary and robbery. He
testified that his schooling had been sporadic,
that he had never learned to read, and that he had
chronic problems with alcohol and drugs.
On June 13, 1989, the trial court, after finding
that the aggravating factors outweighed the
mitigating evidence, sentenced Hoffman to
death. In a written decision, the court found that
two statutory aggravating factors, the killing of
a government witness and the particularly
"heinous, atrocious and cruel" nature of the
murder, outweighed the mitigating factors,
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which included Hoffman's drug addiction,
educational deficiencies, and disadvantaged
social background.
Hoffman's petition for state post-conviction
relief was timely filed on July 25, 1989, by trial
counsel Wellman and Coulter, who continued to
provide legal representation. Counsel requested
an additional psychological evaluation, which
was denied. The state court held an evidentiary
hearing on the petition, which alleged multiple
claims of error at trial and sentencing, and
denied relief on December 13, 1989.
Wellman and Coulter appealed to the Idaho
Supreme Court. The appeal consolidated the
direct appeal and post-conviction claims of error
as required by Idaho Code 6 19-2719. No issues
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel were
raised in the appeal. On January 29, 1993, the
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Hoffman's death
sentence and the state trial court's denial of his
post-conviction petition. See Hoffman. 85 1
P.2d at 944,cert. denied, Hoffman v. Idaho. 5 11
U.S. 1012. 114 S.Ct. 1387, 128 L.Ed.2d 61
(1994').

Hoffman, represented by newly appointed
counsel, Charles Peterson ("Peterson") and
Ellison Matthews ("Matthews"), filed a second
petition for post-conviction relief in the state
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district court on July 7, 1995. The petition
alleged fourteen grounds for relief, including
three claims asserting that petitioner had been
denied the effective assistance ofcounsel attrial,
sentencing, and on direct appeal. The state
moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that the
fourteen claims were procedurally defaulted
because Idaho Code 6 19-2719 mandates the
filing of all post-conviction claims within
forty-two days of the entry of judgment. The
state district court denied relief on May 20,
1996.
Hoffman's attorneys appealed the dismissal of
the second petition to the Idaho Supreme Court.
The state filed a motion to dismiss, in which it
renewed its argument that the claims were
procedurally defaulted. On December 6, 1996,
the Idaho Supreme Court issued a brief,
unexplained ruling granting the state's motion.
See Hoffman. 973 F.Supo. at 1164.
On April 2, 1996, Hoffman's counsel filed a
federal habeas petition in the United States
District Court for the District of Idaho asserting,
inter alia, that: Idaho Code 6 19-2719 deprived
petitioner of his 3 2 9 constitutional right to due
process and equal protection; counsel's
performance at trial, sentencing, and on appeal
was deficient and prejudicial in violation of
petitioner's Sixth Amendments rights;
petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel
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claims were not procedurally barred; the trial
court's refusal to allow petitioner to have
counsel present for the presentence interview
conducted by the probation officer violated his
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights; and the "heinous, atrocious and cruel"
aggravating factor listed under Idaho Code 4
19-2515(h)(5) was unconstitutionally vague.
See Hoflman, 973 F.Supj~.at 1152.
The District Court of Idaho issued two opinions
concerning Hoffman's habeas petition. In the
first opinion, issued on June 13, 1997, the court
dismissed with prejudice some of Hoffman's
claims for relief, including his ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, based upon a
finding of procedural defau1t.E
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the state supreme court's proportionality
review; and (4) the Idaho statute
authorizing the imposition of the death
sentence without jury involvement
violated his Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. The
district court's findings of procedural
default with respect to these claims were
correct and this court has no jurisdiction
to review them.

On December 28,1998, the district court issued
its second opinion concerning Hoffman's habeas
petition, which addressed the merits of the
remaining claims??
See id. The court
rejected all of the surviving claims in the
petition. See id.
On January 20, 1999,
Hoffman's counsel filed a notice of appeal of the
district court's denial of the petition.

FN5. The district court also found that
petitioner had procedurally defaulted his
claims that: (1) the denial of funds for a
psychiatrist to assist petitioner's counsel
at the state post-conviction proceedings
violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendment rights; (2) the imposition of
the death penalty was disproportionateto
the nature of the crime and to the crimes
for which other defendants had been
sentenced to death in violation of his
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights; (3) Idaho Code 4
19-2827 failed to channel meaningfully

FN6. On February 27,1998, in between
the first and second district court
opinions, Hoffman filed a pro se motion
to dismiss his habeas counsel, drop all
further appeals, and vacate the stay of
execution. On March 18, the district
court ordered a psychological evaluation
of Hoffman. A competency hearing was
held on May 6, and on May 8, Hoffman
was found competent to dismiss his
appeals. On May 15, the court received
documents signed by petitioner that
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included a motion to reappoint counsel
to represent him and a statement
authorizing appointed counsel to file a
petition for rehearing. The court
reappointed Peterson and Ellison to
represent petitioner. On May 22, counsel
filed a motion to reinstate Hoffman's
habeas petition. At the evidentiary
hearing on the motion to reconsider, Dr.
Craig W. Beaver, the court-appointed
psychiatrist, testified that petitioner
suffered from a mental defect because of
his low IQ and had "a mental disease or
disorder" because of significant
depression. On June 1, the court granted
petitioner's motion to reinstate the
habeas petition.
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121 The

right to the effective assistance of
counsel is "fundamental and essential to fair
trials." Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
344. 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); see
also Evitts v. Lucev, 469 U.S. 387,394-96, 105
S.Ct 830. 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). Because this
right "lies at the very foundation of the
adversary system of criminal justice," habeas
courts must be "particularly vigilant in
scrutinizing the adequacy of state rules of
procedural default which have the effect of
barring federal habeas review of claims of
ineffective *530 assistance of counsel." Enqlish
v. Codv. 146 F.3d 1257, 1259 (10th
Cir.1998).m7

FN7.The Supreme Court has recognized
JlJ2J
The district court's decision to grant or
habeas petition is reviewed de
deny a 6
novo. Bribiesca v. Galaza, 215 F.3d 1015.1018
(9th Cir.2000). Dismissal based on state
procedural default presents issues of law
reviewed de novo. Fields v. Calderon. 125 F.3d
757,759-60 (9th Cir.1997).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

that ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, unlike most claims alleging error
at trial and sentencing, are best presented
for the first time in collateral
proceedings when the defendant is
represented by new counsel, rather than
on direct appeal, when the defendant is
often represented by trial counsel. See
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,
378, I06 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305
11986)( "Indeed, an accused will often
not realize that he has a meritorious
ineffectiveness claim until he begins
collateral proceedings, particularly if he
retained trial counsel on direct appeal.").
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In this petition, Hoffman renews claims that he
was deprived of his constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel at trial,
sentencing, and on appeal. The district court
held that Idaho Code 6 19-2719 constituted a
procedural bar that precluded federal habeas
review of Hoffman's ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. While we agree with the district
court that Hoffman's ineffective assistance of
counsel claims are vrocedurallv defaulted under
Idaho Code 6 19-2?19, we findthat the statute is
an unreasonable restriction on the exercise of the
federally protected constitutional right to
counsel and therefore is inadequate to bar
federal review. Michel v. Lousiana, 350 U.S. 91,
93-94, 76 S.Ct. 158. 100 L.13d. 83 (19551;
Endish, 146 F.3d at 1260-64.

A. Procedural Default

Ifll Idaho

Code 6 19-2719 requires capital
defendants to "file any legal or factual challenge
to the sentence or conviction that is known or
reasonably should be known"
within
forty-two days of the entry ofjudgment.? The
judgment against Hoffman was entered on June
13, 1989. Hoffman's ineffective assistance of
counsel claims were raised for the first time in a
second petition for post-conviction relief, which
was filed on July 7, 1995. The state responded
with amotion to dismiss, arguing that the claims
in Hoffman's post-conviction petition were

procedurally defaulted because they were not
timely filed within the forty-two day period
required by the statute. In a two-sentence order,
the Idaho Supreme Court granted the state's
motion and dismissed the petition.
See
Hoffman. 973 F.Suvp. at 1164. The federal
district court concluded that Hoffman's
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, raised
for the first time after the expiration of the
statute's forty-two day deadline, were
procedurally defaulted. Id. at 1165-66; see also
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 111
S.Ct. 2590,115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991'); Coleman v.
Thom~son.501 U.S. 722. 735-36, 111 S.Ct.
2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). We agree with
the district court that Hoffman's ineffective
assistance of counsel claims are procedurally
defaulted under Idaho Code 6 19-2719, but now
address the question whether this procedural
default is adequate to preclude federal review.
FN8. Idaho Code 6
-

19-2719(3) (West

2000).

FN9. The Idaho Supreme Court has
upheld the constitutionality of the
statute's 42 day filing requirement. See
State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795. 820
P.2d 665, 676 (19911, cert. denied,=
U.S. 987. 112 S.Ct. 2970. 119 L.Ed.2d
590 (1992).
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B. The Adequate and Independent State Law
Grounds Doctrine

151 In

the usual case, state procedural rules
dictate the time and manner in which federal
constitutional rights are adjudicated in state
court. Comity and federalism require federal
courts to defer to the states' "dignitary interest in
seeing that their state law decisions are not
ignored by a federal habeas court." Coleman,
501 U.S. at 738. 111 S.Ct. 2546. When a state
court litigant raises a federal claim in a manner
that does not comply with a state procedural
rule, the state court may dismiss that claim as
defaulted. So long as the dismissal relies on a
state law ground that is independent of the
federal question and adequate to support the
judgment, it will be insulated from federal
review. See, *531 e.g., Wainwri~htv. Svkes,
433 U.S. 72,81,97 S.Ct. 2497.53 L.Ed.2d 594

0.
The Supreme Court has held, however, that
if a state procedural rule f'rustrates the exercise
of a federal right, that rule is "inadequate" to
preclude federal courts from reviewing the
merits of the federal claim. See, e.g., Staub v.
CitvofBaxlev. 355 U.S. 313,325.78 S.Q. 277.
2 L.Ed.2d 302 (1958) (holding that denial of
petitioner's constitutional claims for failure to
attack specific sections of the challenged
ordinance was an inadequate state law ground).
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aThe "inadequate" state grounds doctrine is
rooted in a concern that a state's rigid adherence
to technical requirements of dubious validity
may result in fundamental unfairness where
federal rights are at stake.
See Davis v.
Wechsler. 263 U.S. 22.23.44 S.Ct. 13.68 L.Ed.
143 (1923J (holding that "the assertion of
Federal rights, when plainly and reasonably
made, is not to be defeated under the name of
local practice"). In a criminal case, the test for
whether a state procedural rule constitutes an
"insuperable barrier" to the assertion of a federal
right is "whether the defendant has had 'a
reasonable opportunity to have the issue as to
the claimed right heard and determined' by the
State court." Michel, 350 U.S. at 93. 76 S.Ct.
158 (internal citations omitted).
-

181 In

Reece v. Georgia, a capital case, the
Supreme Court applied the Michel test to a state
court's dismissal of petitioner's challenge to the
composition of the grand jury, filed afier an
indictment was returned. The Georgia Supreme
Court refused to consider Reece's claim on the
merits, holding that Reece's claim was untimely
under a state procedural rule requiring
defendants to raise grand jury composition
challenges before the indictment was returned.
See Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85.89.76 S.Ct.
167, 100 L.Ed. 77 (1955). The Supreme Court
reversed. Noting that Reece had no access to
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counsel during the preindictment stage of the
proceedings and that the grand jury was
convened by an order that failed to give him
notice that acase was being brought against him,
the Court concluded that the state court's finding
of procedural default was "utterly unrealistic."
Id The Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Michel test in Reece makes clear that where the
application of a state procedural rule operates to
frustrate the exercise of a federal constitutional
right, federal courts may reach the merits of the
underlying federal claim.

C. Idaho Code 6'19-2719 Frustrated the
Exercise o"f Hoffman's
Sixth Amendment
""
Claims
The unique difficulties involved in arguing
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel have
led federal habeas courts to find "inadequate" a
state procedural bar that denies a petitioner "any
meaningful review of his ineffective assistance
claim." Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343,
1364 (10th Cir. 19941. Indeed, three federal
circuit courts have held that where a criminal
defendant does not comply with the procedural
requirement that his ineffective assistance of
counsel claims be raised on direct appeal, he has
not, in most circumstances, waived his right to
have a federal court review those claims on the
merits.
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In English v. Cody, the Tenth Circuit held that a
criminal defendant must be able to obtain an
objective assessment of trial counsel's
performance and be allowed to develop
adequately the factual basis of any ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Considering an
Oklahoma statute requiring criminal defendants
to raise all ineffective assistance of counsel
claims on direct review, the court concluded that
the state law would not bar federal review on the
grounds of procedural default unless: (1) the
defendant was appointed separate counsel on
appeal; and (2) the claim could be resolved on
the basis of the trial record alone. The opinion
noted that, unless one of the narrow exceptions
applied, there is a "constitutional imperative that
this court "532 disregard a state
bar
for the review of ineffective assistance [of
counsel] claims." Enalish, 146 F.3d at 1261.
The Second and Seventh Circuits have reached
the same conclusion. See Guinan v. United
States, 6 F.3d 468, 471-73 (7th Cir.1993)
(holding that ineffective assistance of counsel
claims not raised on direct appeal were not
waived if the defendant continued to be
represented by trial counsel or if the
ineffectiveness claims required investigation
outside of the trial record); Ciak v. United
States, 59 F.3d 296. 303-04 (2d Cir.1995)
(same).
Because Idaho's unitary statute requires the
consolidation of post-conviction and direct
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appeal claims in a single petition and requires
such consolidated claims to be filed within
forty-two days of entry of judgment, it requires
ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be
raised on direct appeal. Thus, Hoffman is
similarly situated to the defendants in Cody,
Guinan, and Ciak with respect to the constraints
imposed by state procedural rules on the
timeliness of his ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.
In 1984, the Idaho Legislature enacted
Code 6 19-2719"to accon~plishthe purpose of
eliminating unnecessary delay in carrying out a
valid death sentence." 2 The statute requires
a capital defendant, within forty-two days of the
entry of the judgment imposing the death
penalty, to "file any legal or factual challenge to
the sentence or conviction that is known or
reasonably should be known."
This
forty-two's33 day deadline is the shortest in the
nation and applies to "[alny remedy available by
post-conviction procedure, habeas corpus or any
other provision of state law." 2 Failure to
file a claim for post-conviction relief within the
statutory time limit is deemed a waiver, and the
Idaho courts are stripped of the jurisdiction to
hear "any such claims for relief." N') In
addition, 3 19-27]9 requires capital defendants
to present simultaneously all post-conviction
and direct appeal claims by combining them in
a single petition for review by the Idaho
Supreme Court.=
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FNIO. Idaho Code 6 19-2719 (West
2000).

FNII.Idaho Code 6

19-271913L The
relevant portions of the statute are set
forth below:
19-2719: Special appellate and
post-conviction procedure for capital
cases-Automatic stay.
The following special procedures shaIl
be interpreted to accomplish the
purpose of eliminating unnecessary
delay in canying out a valid death
sentence.
(1) When the punishment of death is
imposed the time for filing an appeal
shall begin to run when the death
warrant is filed.
(2) The death warrant shall not be filed
until forty-two (42) days after the
judgment imposing the death sentence
has been filed, or, in the event a
post-conviction challenge to the
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conviction or sentence is filed, until
the order deciding such
post-conviction challenge is filed.

(3) Within forty-two (42) days of the
filing of the judgment imposing the
punishment of death, and before the
death wanant is filed, the defendant
must file any legal or factual challenge
to the sentence or conviction that is
knownor reasonably should be known.
(4) Any remedy available by
post-conviction procedure, habeas
corpus or any other provision of state
law must be pursued according to the
procedures set forth in this section and
within the time limitations of
subsection (3) of this section.

(5) If the defendant fails to apply for
relief as provided in this section and
within the time limits specified, he
shall be deemed to have waived such
claims for relief as were known, or
reasonably should have been known.
The courts of Idaho shall have no
power to consider any such claims for
relief as have been so waived or grant
any such relief....
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(6) In the event the defendant desires
to appeal from any post-conviction
order entered pursuant to this section,
his appeal must be part of any appeal
taken from the conviction or sentence.
All issues relating to conviction,
sentence and post-conviction challenge
shall be considered in the same
appellate proceeding.
(7) If post-conviction challenge is
made under this section, questions
raised thereby shall be heard and
decided by the district court within
ninety (90) days of the filing of any
motion or petition for relief timely
filed as provided by this section. The
court shall give first priority to capital
cases. In the event the district court
fails to act within the time specified,
the supreme court of Idaho shall, on its
own motion or the motion of any
party, order the court to proceed
forthwith, or if appropriate, reassign
the case to another judge. When the
supreme court intervenes as provided,
it shall set a reasonable time limit for
disposition of the issues before the
district court.
(8) The time limit provided in
subsection (7) of this section for
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disposition of post-conviction claims
may be extended only upon a showing
of extraordinary circumstances which
would make it impossible to fairly
consider defendant'sclaims in the time
provided. Such showing must be made
under oath and the district court's
finding that extraordinary
circumstances exist for extending the
time shall be in writing and shall be
immediately reported to the supreme
court, which shall at once
independently consider the sufficiency
of the circumstances shown and
determine whether an extension of
time is warranted.

(9) When a judgment imposing the
penalty of death is filed, the clerk and
the reporter shall begin preparation of
the transcripts of the trial, and other
proceedings, and the clerk's transcript.

(11) Any successive petition for
post-conviction relief not within the
exception of subsection (5) of this
section shall be dismissed summarily.
Notwithstanding any other statute or
rule, the order of dismissal shall not be
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subject to any motion to alter, amend
or reconsider. Such order shall not be
subject to any requirement for the
giving of notice of the court's intent to
dismiss. The order of dismissal shall
not be appealable.

FN12.Id. at (4).
FN13.Id. at (5).
FN14. Currently, only California,
Colorado, Idaho, and Texas have
statutory schemes that require capital
defendants to pursue simultaneously
post-conviction and direct appeal claims
in appealing to the state's highest court.
See infra note 18. Similar statutes
adopted in Florida, Missouri, and
Pennsylvania have been invalidated.
Florida's version of the unitary
post-conviction-appellate statute, the
Death Penalty Reform Act (DPRA),
2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 00-3 (West),
was struck down as unconstitutional
under the state constitution by the
Florida Supreme Court. See Allen v.
Butterworth. 756 So.2d 52. 54
(Fla.2000) (stating that "although our
holding is based on the separation of
powers claim, we find that some sections

02008 Thomson ReutersIWest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Worlts.

236 F.3d 523
236 F.3d 523,Ol Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 107,2001 Daily Journal D.A.R. 159
of the DPRA also violate due process
and equal protection"). Missouri's
unitary system, codified in Mo. R.Crim.
P. 24.035, 29.15, was amended on
January 1,1996, to provide for tlie filing
of all post-conviction motions "within
ninety days a$er the date the mandate of
the appellate court is issued." Mo.
R.Crim. P. 29.15(b) (West 2000)
(emphasis added). The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court shuck down its version
of the consolidated statute, the Capital
Unitary Review Act, which was passed
by the state's legislature in 1995. See42
Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. 6 6 9571(b),9577(a)
(suspended by Order of Aug. 11, 1997).
The court held that the statute violated
the state's constitution by "directly
conflicting with existing procedural
rules." See In re Suspension o f Capital
Unitarv Review Act, 554 Pa. 625. 722
A.2d 676.680 (19992.
The Idaho Supreme Court has strictly conshued
the waiver provision of the statute as limiting a
capital defendant to "one opportunity to raise all
challenges to the conviction and sentence in a
petition for post-conviction relief' except in
"unusual cases." Rhoades, 820 P.2d at 677,cert.
denied504 U.S. 987. 112 S.Ct. 2970, 119
L.Ed.2d 590 (1992). Allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel are not considered claims
that fall within the "unusual cases" exception,
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but instead are considered claims that "should
reasonably be known immediately upon the
completion ofhial." Pizzuto v. State. 127 Idaho
469. 903 P.2d 58, 61 (1995); see also
State. 123 Idaho 758, 852 P.2d 1355. 1356-57
03).
This is true even if the capital defendant
seeking review of his ineffective assistance of
counsel claims is also represented by trial
counsel during post-conviction proceedings.
See Paz, 852 P.2d at 1357-58 & n. 3 (Bistline,
J., dissenting).
Applying Idaho's forty-two day filing deadline to
Hoffman's ineffective assistance of counsel
claims raises fairness concerns similar to those
posed by applying Georgia's statute of
limitations to Reece's grand jury composition
challenge. In Hoffman's case, the Idaho Supreme
Court held that petitioner's ineffective assistance
of counsel claims were procedurally barred
because they were filed after the expiration of
the state's forty-two day statutory deadline. The
Idaho Supreme Court applied the rule despite the
fact that Hoffman"534 continued to be
represented by his original trial counsel during
the forty-two day period.?
See also EnglishL
146 F.3d at 1260 (observing that ineffective
assistance of counsel claims involve assertions
of attorney incompetence that require a
petitioner "to consult with different counsel on
appeal in order to obtain an objectiveassessment
of trial counsel's performance").
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FN15. This

was true of all indigent
capital defendants in Idaho prior to
1995. Effective August 8, 1995, the
Idaho Legislature amended Idaho Code
4 19-2719 to require an "Inquiry Into the
Need For New Counsel." The 1995
provision provides, in relevant part:
After the imposition of a sentence of
death, the trial judge should advise the
defendant that, upon a particularized
showing that there is a reasonable
basis to litigate a claim of ineffective
assistanceof trial counsel, new counsel
may be appointed to represent the
defendant to pursue such a claim in a
post-conviction proceeding.
Idaho Code 6 19-2719A.
Significantly,both the Idaho Supreme Court and
the Idaho legislature have since adopted new
regulations designed to prevent this situation
from recurring. In 1995, the Idaho Supreme
Court promulgated Idaho Criminal Rule 44.2,
which requires the trial court in a capital case to
appoint at least one attorney other than trial
counsel to represent the defendant in
post-conviction proceedings. In the same year,
the Idaho legislature enacted Idaho Code 6
19-2719A, which permits the trial court to
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advise capital defendants that they are entitled to
new counsel to pursue ineffective assistance of
counsel claims at post-conviction
proceedings!?

FN16.See

1995 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch.
140.The Idaho Supreme Court has yet to
address the apparent conflict between
Idaho Crim. R. 44.2 and Idaho Code $
19-271 9 4 although anecdotal evidence
suggests that Idaho trial courts are
applying Idaho Crim. R. 44.2.

Idaho's forty-two day filing deadline, as applied
to Hoffman, is uniquely harsh. Most states
permit defendants to file petitions for
post-conviction relief following the completion
of their direct appea1s.F This bifurcated
system allows for the appointment of new
counsel, who can evaluate the record objectively
to determine whether there are meritorious
claims of ineffective assistance at trial and
sentencing.

FN17. See supra note 14.
In Hoffman's case, the application of 4 19-2719,
which at that time did not provide for the
appointment of independent counsel, permitted
trial counsel to continue to represent him during
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post-convictionproceedings, which they did. As
a result, Hoffman was deprived of counsel who
could review the record objectively for
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Not
surprisingly, Hoffman's trial counsel failed to
raise and argue the issue of their own
ineffectiveness in post-conviction proceedings.
The practical reality, recognized by other states
that employ the unitary post-conviction and
appellate procedures =-and,
ultimately,
recognized by the state of Idaho itself y - i s that
"[ilt is the rare attorney who can be expected to
contend on appeal that his representation was so
poor that he deprived his client of a fair trial."
Ciak. 59 F.3d at 303.

FN18.

Currently, only three other
states-California, Colorado, and
Texas-employ a unitary scheme
consolidating the post-conviction and
appellate procedures into a single
petition for review by the state's highest
court. Of these, the Colorado and Texas
statutes provide for the replacement of
trial counsel with a different attorney
when a defendant indicates that he
intends to pursue ineffective assistance
of counsel claims in post-conviction
proceedings.
SeeColo. R.Crim. P.
32.2(bM3); Tex.Crim.App. R. for
Appointment of Counsel under art.
11071, 5 2(d) (adopted by per curiam
order of August 2, 1999).
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FN19. Effective

August 8, 1995, the
Idaho Legislature amended Idaho Code
3 19-2719 to require an "Inquily Into the
Need For New Counsel" where a capital
defendant indicates that he wishes to
raise claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. SeeIdaho Code 6 19-2719(A)
and supra note 11.
No allegation of ineffective assistance of
counsel was made on Hoffman's behalf until
1995, when a successive petition for *535
post-conviction relief was filed by appointed
counsel Peterson and Matthews, who replaced
Hoffman's trial counsel. Peterson and Matthews
investigated errors apparent from the record, and
supplied the court with depositions and
affidavits in which Hoffman's trial counsel
admitted that they failed to: (1) obtain or review
their client's educational, medical, or
psychological records; (2) request a psychiatric
evaluation of their client until after the trial
despite awareness of his illiteracy, low
intelligence, and psychological problems; and
(3) follow up on the conclusion, stated in Dr.
Sanford's report, that Hoffman suffered from
possible brain damage.
Peterson and Matihews also investigated errors
outside of the record, and supplied the court
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with depositions and affidavits in which trial
counsel, neither of whom had previously tried a
capital case, admitted that they had advised
Hoffman to reject apleaof life in prison because
they mistakenly believed, based on their
misinterpretation of existing case law, that the
Idaho death penalty statute would be found
unconstitutional. Peterson and Matthews's
petition was the first time that allegations
documenting specific instances in which
Hoffman's counsel had been ineffective had
been presented to the state court.
As Peterson and Matthews's investigation
shows, a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel requires review of the trial transcript and
the entire record to determine the nature,
frequency, and effect of counsel's errors. But
Idaho Code 6 19-2719 makes no provision for
expedited delivery of trial transcripts to ensure
that compliance with the forty-two day filing
deadline does not deprive capital defendants of
access to the complete record of their cases.?
Indeed, the record indicates that Hoffman's trial
counsel prepared their post-conviction petition
for relief without access to the trial transcript,
which was completed on November 6, 1989,
more than three months after the post-conviction
petition was filed. Completion and service ofthe
full record did not occur until late March of
1990, several months after the state court ruled
to deny Hoffman's post-conviction petition.
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FN20.The only reference in Idaho Code
19-2719 to the compilation of trial and
sentencing records pending
post-conviction proceedings states:
"When a judgment imposing the penalty
of death is filed, the clerk and the
reporter shall begin preparation of the
transcripts of the trial, and other
proceedings, and the clerk's transcript."
Idaho Code 6 19-2719(9). The statute
directs that preparation of the record
begin immediately following the entry of
a capital judgment, but provides no
reciprocal mandatory date of completion.
The investigation conducted by Peterson and
Matthews also shows that raising a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel requires that
new counsel have the opportunity to conduct an
investigation beyond the court records to
uncover possible omissions made by trial
counsel in the investigation and presentation of
the case. See, e.g.,Osborn v. Shillinper, 861
F.2d 6 1 2 , 6 2 3 (10th C i r . 1 9 8 8 )
("[I]neffectiveness claims are ordinarily
inappropriate to raise on direct appeal because
they ... cannot be made on the basis of the record
1.1"); Cruz v. Warden, 907 F.2d 665, 670 (7th
Cir. 1990') ("An ineffective assistance claim
alleging that counsel failed to prepare involves
facts outside the trial record and presents a
situation in which the Illinois courts will not
invoke the res judicata or waiver doctrines.").
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Hofhan's case involves allegations of
ineffectiveness at trial, sentencing, and on
appeal, stemming from counsel's legally
inaccurate advice regarding the possibility that
the death penalty would be imposed and
counsel's failure to review educational,physical,
and psychiatric records in order to present
mitigating evidence. All of these allegations
required investigation outside of the record at
trial.
For the reasons outlined above, 4 19-2719
effectivelyprevented Hoffman from "536timely
raising his ineffective assistance of counsel
claims.

D. Evidentiary Hearing on Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims
Because the state court denied Hoffman's
ineffective assistance of counsel claims without
holding a hearing, and the Idaho Supreme Court
and the federal district court affirmed the denial
on procedural grounds, those claims have never
been litigated on the merits. Without the benefit
of an evidentiary hearing, it is impossible to
evaluate the strength of Hoffman's defense at
trial and sentencing. Therefore, we cannot
conclude as a matter of law that there is no
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reasonable possibility that offering expert
testimony and a thorough history of Hoffman's
educational, medical, and psychological
problems at the time of the murder might have
reduced the lilcelihood that the death penalty
would have been imposed. We therefore remand
for an evidentiary hearing to develop a factual
record regarding Hoffman's ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. See Siriaonzs v.
Calderon. 35 F.3d 1308, 1315-16 (9th
Cir.1994'); Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153,
1170 (9th Cir. 1990).

111.
Petitioner's Fifth and Sixth Amendment
Rights During The Presentence Interview
[l S 11121 Hoffman challenges the trial court's
denial of his request to have counsel present
during the presentence interview with the
probation officer as a violation of his Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Hoffman contends that under Estelle v. Smith.
451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866.68 L.Ed.2d 359
0,
the court may not, during the capital
sentencing hearing, and when making the
sentence determination, rely upon statements
obtained through the custodial presentence
interview without the aid of counsel. Although
petitioner failed to raise this claim in his
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consolidated appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court,
the Idaho death penalty statute requires
mandatory review of the entire record for
sentencing errors. See Beam v. Pasketl, 3 F.3d
1301, 1306-07 (9th Cir.19931, overruled on
other grounds by Lambright v. Stewarl. 191
F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999). All sentencing
errors are treated as implicitly raised, removing
the bar of procedural default. See Beam, 3 F.3d
at 1306-07. The federal district court thus
appropriately reached the merits of Hoffman's
Fifth and Sixth Amendment Estelle claims. See
Hoffman, 73 F.Supp.2d at 1203-07. The district
court denied the claims by distinguishing
Hoffman's case from Estelle, and held that the
presentence interview is not a critical stage. See
id, at 1207. Because we conclude that Estelle
controls in the context of a capital case, we
reverse.
In all capital cases, Idaho law requires a
presentence investigation and report prior to the
commencement of the sentencing hearing.
SeeIdaho Code 6 19-2515(c); State v. Creech,
105 Idaho 362. 670 P.2d 463 (19831. The
presentence report provides "crucial
information" to the court, Idaho v. Romero. 1 16
Idaho 391,396,775 P.2d 1233 (1 9891, including
information about the defendant's social history,
educational background, "sense of values and
outlook on life," and the "presentence
investigator's analysis." I.C.R. 32. The trial
court denied Hoffman's motion for counsel at
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the presentence interview, and the probation
officer refused Hoffman's renewed requests for
counsel during the interview itself. The trial
court instructed the Deputy Attorney General to
ensure that Hoffman was advised by the
probation officer at the beginning of his
presentence interview of his right to remain
silent. See fIofhnzan, 73 F.Supp.2d. at 1206.
During the interview, Hoffman made a number
of incriminating statements. He discussed the
murder of Denise Williams with the probation
officer and made multiple equivocal statements
about his involvement.*537 NZ' Hoffman
conceded in the interview that he had known
that Williams was an informant and that he did
not think that what she did was right. Hoffman
also told the probation officer that although he
had recently found the "Lord," he had been
previously living the life of a "demon." Most
significantly, Hoffman admitted that he had been
present at two unrelated murders and indicated
that although he could have helped prevent these
murders, he did not make any such attempt. The
probation officer recommended in the
presentence report to the trial court that Hoffman
be sentenced to the "maximum punishment,"
which in this case was death.

FN21. When

asked whether he was
involved in William's murder Hoffman
told the probation officer, "I'm not
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saying I'm not involved and I'm not
saying I am involved." Hoffman would
not answer yes or no to the probation
officer's question about whether
Hoffman was present at the time of the
murder. The presentence report explains
that Hoffman refused to answer no
"because he could be lying."
1131r1411151 Idaho contends that applying
Estelle to Hoffman's case would constitute a
new rule in violation of Teame v. Lane. 489
U.S. 288. 109 S.Ct. 1060. 103 L.Ed.2d 334
Once the state raises the Teague defense,
we are compelled to address whether Teague
applies before determining the merits of the
claim. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383,
389. 114 S.Ct. 948, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994).
With few exceptions, the Teague
non-retroactivity doctrine prohibits courts from
announcing new rules of law in federal habeas
pr0ceedings.y See, e.g., Revnoldsville Casket
Co. v. Hvde, 514U.S.749,758,115S.Ct. 1745,
131 L.Ed.2d 820 (1995). A decision announces
a "new rule" if it "breaks new ground or imposes
anewobligation." Teaaue. 489U.S. at 301,109
S.Ct. 1060. "To determine what counts as anew
rule, Teague requires courts to ask whether the
rule a habeas petitioner seeks can be
meaningfully distinguishedfrom that established
by binding precedent at the time his state court
conviction became final." Wright v. West. 505
U.S. 277,304,112 S.Ct. 2482,120 L.Ed.2d 225

m.
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(1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring). We consider

the "legal landscape as it [ ] existed" on March
28, 1994, the date Hoffman's conviction and
sentence became final.= Casvari, 5 10 U.S. at
390,114 S.Ct. 948 (internalquotations omitted).

FN22. The

Supreme Court's plurality
opinion delineated two exceptions to the
non-retroactivity principle announced in
Teague:
(1) new rules that place
"certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of
the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe," and (2) new rules involving
procedures "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." Teaaue. 489 U.S. at
307, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (internal quotations
omitted).

FN23.

The Supreme Court denied
Hoffman's petition for certiorari on
March 28,1994. See Hoffman v. Idaho.
511 U.S. 1012, 114 S.Ct. 1387, 128
L.Ed.2d 61 (1994).

A. Hoffman's Ffth Amendment Claim

1161 The

Supreme Court decided Estelle v.
Smith in 1981, over a decade before Hoffman's
conviction became final. In Estelle, a Texas trial
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court sua sponte ordered the state's attorney to
mange apsychiatric evaluation of the defendant
to determine the defendant's competency to
stand trial. See Estelle, 451 U.S. at 456-57. 101
S.Ct. 1866.The defendant was foundcompetent,
and, after a jury trial, convicted of murder. See
id. at 457,101 S.Ct. 1866. As required by Texas
law, a separate proceeding was then undertaken
before the same jury to consider whether the
defendant should receive the death penalty. See
id. at458.101 S.Ct 1866. During the sentencing
hearing, the state offered the testimony of the
court-appointed psychiatrist, who had
interviewed the defendant solelv for comDetencv
purposes, to establish the defendant's future
dangerousness. The psychiatrist testified before
the jury that the defendant "is a very severe
sociopath," that "he will continue his previous
behavior," that his condition will "only get
worse," and that he "has no remorse or sorrow
for what he has done." *538 id at 459-60.101
S.Ct. 1866. After hearing the psychiatrist's
testimony, the jury imposed the death penalty.
See id.
The Supreme Court in Estelle concluded that the
Fifth Amendment applied to the defendant's
interview with the psychiatrist, when the
incriminating statements made by the defendant
formed the basis of the psychiatrist's testimony,
which was considered by the jury in determining
the sentence to be imposed on the defendant. Id.
at 462-69. 101 S.Ct. 1866. The Supreme Court

Page 30

began its Fifth Amendment analysis by noting
that "the availability of the ... [Fifth
Amendment] privilege does not turn upon the
type of proceeding in which its protection is
invoiced, hut upon the nature of the statement or
admission and the exposure which it invites."
Id. at 462. 101 S.Ct. 1866 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court then found that the
consequence at stake in capital sentencing, the
"ultimate penalty of death," triggered the
constitutional protection of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at462-63.101 S.Ct. 1866. "Just
as the Fifth Amendment prevents a criminal
defendant from being made 'the deluded
instrument of his own conviction,' it protects
him as well from being made the 'deluded
instrument' of his own execution." Id. at 462,
101 S.Ct. 1866 (internal citations omitted).
One year later, this court concluded that under
Estelle, the Fifth Amendment applied to
inculpatory statements made during a
presentence interview with a probation officer.
See .Jones v. Curdwell, 686 F.2d 754. 756 (9th
Cir.1982) ("The reasoning that underlies the
decision in Estelle supports application of the
Fifth Amendment privilege to the sentencing
procedures in the instant case."). We reasoned
that although not

every encounter between the state and a
convicted but unsentenced defendant brings
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the Fifth Amendment privilege into play ....
[Wlhere, as here, the state's agent seelts from
the convicted defendant a confession of
additionalcriminal activity and that confession
is used to enhance a defendant's sentence, we
think it beyond peradventure that the
defendant may properly claim the protection of
the privilege against self-incrimination.

Hoffman's claim that his Fifth Amendment
privilege applied during the presentence
interview is controlled by the Supreme Court's
ruling in Estelle that a capital defendant's
inculpatory statementsmade during an interview
with a psychiatrist are protected by the Fifth
Amendment privilege, and this court's ruling in
Jones that a defendant's inculpatory statements
made during a presentence interview are
protected by the Fifth Amendment when the
statements may be used to increase the severity
of sentencing. We therefore reject the
government's argument that Hoffman's Fifth
Amendment claim is barred by Teague, and
proceed to consider the claim on the merits.

1171 Hoffman's

Fifth Amendment claim is
undercut by the fact that Hoffman was advised
that he could exercise his Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent during the presentence
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interview. See Hofman. 73 F.Supp.2d at 1206.
Hoffman does not argue on appeal that the
damaging statements made during the
presentence interview were involuntary in
violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege. Cf:
Jones, 686 F.2d at 757 .(holding statements
involuntary where probation officer instructed
defendant to answer all questions and questioned
defendant about additional criminal activity).
We concludethat although the Fifth Amendment
privilege applies, it was not violated in the
circumstance of this particular case.

B. Hofian's Sixth Amendment Claim
118111911201The Sixth Amendment guarantees
a criminal defendant "the right ... to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S.
Const. amend. VI. "[Tlhe Sixth Amendment
right to counsel attachesk539 'at or after the
initiation of adversary judicial criminal
proceedings-whether by way of formal charge,
preliminav hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment.' " United States v. Harrison. 213
F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,689,92 S.Ct. 1877.32
L.Ed.2d 41 1 (19721). Hoffman's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attached before
trial. See Estelle. 451 U.S. at 469-70, 101 S.Ct.
1866.Once the right has attached, the Sixth
Amendment "is violated whenever the accused
is denied counsel at a critical stage" of the
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adversary proceeding. United States v. Bohn,
890 F.2d 1079. 1080 (9th Cir.1989) (internal
quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has
long recognized sentencing as a critical stage.
See, e.g., Gardnerv. Florida. 430U.S. 349,358,
97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) ("[Ilt is
now clear that the sentencing process, as well as
the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of
the Due Process Clause.... [Tlhe sentencing is a
critical stage ofthe criminal proceeding at which
[the defendant] is entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel."). The issue in this case is
whether the presentence interview conducted by
a probation officer in preparation for the capital
sentencing hearing constitutes a "critical stage"
of the judicial proceedings.

1211 Hoffman again relies

on Estelle for his
claim that he was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel during the presentence
interview. As set forth above, the Supreme
Court held in Estelle that the defendant's right to
counsel extended to an interview with a
court-appointed psychiatrist prior to sentencing.
451 U.S. at 469-70, 101 S.Ct. 1866. The Court
reasoned that the interview played a significant
role in sentencing, and thus constituted a
"critical stage" for the purpose of the Sixth
Amendment analysis. Id at 470-71. 101 S.Ct.
1866. Hoffman contends that Eslelle governs his
case, because like the defendant in Estelle,
Hoffman faces sentencing, "literally a life or
death matter," based on information gathered in
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an interview conducted without the benefit of
counsel. See id. at 471, 101 S.Ct. 1866.
The state argues that this court's decision in
Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565 (9th
Cir.19821, forecloses the application of Estelle
to presentence interviews in capital cases, and
that any decision to the contrary would violate
Teague. We read Baumann differently. The
defendant in Baumann was sentenced to a
five-year prison term on four counts of mail
fraud. 692 F.2d at 569. Baumann relied on
Estelle and challenged the lack of counsel during
his presentence interview as a denial of his Sixth
Amendment right. Id. at 574. We rejected
Baumann's claim, declining to characterize a
"routine" presentence interview as a critical
stage. Id. at 578.
We similarly rejected
Baumann's Fifth Amendment claim that he was
entitled to full Miranda warnings before
submittingto apresentence interview. Id. at 576.
We reached our Fifth and Sixth Amendment
conclusions in Baumann by distinguishing the
capital bifurcated jury proceeding in Estelle
from Baumann's "noncapital," "routine"
sentencing. 692 F.2d at 576-78. We noted that
the question of whether the defendant in
Baumann was entitled to Fifth and Sixth
Amendment protection during the non-capital
presentence interview had some "similarity to
the [question] advanced in Estelle," but read
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penalty and lesser punishments," and
overturning death sentence because the jury was
not instructed on a lesser included noncapital
offense); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280,305,96 S.Ct. 2978.49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976)
(finding that "the penalty of death is
Our decision in Baumann not to apply the Fifth qualitatively different from a sentence of
and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel to imprisonment," and therefore holding North
routine presentence interviews with probation Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute
officers rested on the "substantial difference[sIn unconstitutional).
in sentencing procedure and stakes between
capital and routine cases. See id. at 576. By
distinguishingthe procedures required in capital We also limited the holding of Baumann. in
presentence stages from those permitted in federal cases in United States v.
non-capital presentence interviews, Baumann Iierrera-Fiaueroa. 918 F.2d 1430 (9th
joined a long line of cases requiring"540 Cir. 1991). In Herrera-Figueroa we exercised
heightened procedural safeguards in capital our supervisory power to require that probation
cases. See Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, officers permit defense attorneys to accompany
125-27.111 S.Ct. 1723,114L.Ed.2d 173 (1991) defendants in all presentence interviews. See
(weighing the "special importance of fair id.
procedure in the capital sentencing context" and
holding that the lack of notice to the defendant
We find that a presentence interview in a
of Idaho's intent to seek the death penalty
violated Due Process); Eddina.7 v. Oklahoma, capital case is a "critical stage" for the purpose
455 U.S. 104, 111, 113-15, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. This
L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (discussing heightened conclusion is compelled by the principle from
protections in capital cases and reversing death Estelle that defendants should not face
sentence because the jury was not permitted to presentencing stages in capital cases without the
consider all of the capital defendant's mitigating benefit of counsel, and the Baumann distinction
character evidence); Beck v. Alabanza, 447 U.S. between capital and non-capital cases.fE The
6
s presentence interview is a mandatory part of
Q?SJj
(noting the Court's "often stated" Idaho's capital sentencing scheme and forms the
principle that "there is a significant basis of the presentence report, considered by
constitutional difference between the death the court during sentencing. "Given the gravity

Estelle "narrowly" and found that the force of
Estelle 's reasoning was "limited to the distinct
circumstances of [ ] bifurcated capital
proceedings." Id. at 575-76.
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of the decision to be made at the penalty phase,
the State is not relieved of the obligation to
observe fundamental constitutionalguarantees."
Estelle. 451 U.S. at 463. 101 S.Ct. 1866. The
stakes for the defendant and for society are too
high to allow defendants to face this important
component of the sentencingprocess without the
"guiding hand of counsel." Id. at 471, 101 S.Ct.
-1866
. We find that this conclusion is dictated by
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent
available at the time of Hoffman's conviction,
and thus conclude that Teague does not apply.

FN24. The

State's reliance on m d
States v. Benlian. 63 F.3d 824 (9th
Cir.1995) for the proposition that a
presentence interview in a capital case is
not acritical stage is equally unavailing.
In Benlian we reiterated our adherence
to the Baumann holding in a non-capital
case where the defendant waived the
right to counsel. See Benlian, 63 F.3d.

a.

Turning to the merits of Hoffman's
claim, we conclude that Hoffman was denied his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the
presentence interview. The next step of our
analysis is to ask whether this constitutional
violation is "harmless error." Satterwhite v.
Texas, 486 U.S. 249.256, 108 S.Ct. 1792. 100
L.Ed.2d284 (1988). We apply the standard from
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Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619.113 S.Ct.
1710. 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), to Hoffman's
habeas petition, and ask whether Hoffman
established that the "error had a substantial and
injurious effect" on his sentence. See Bains v.
Cambra, 204 F.3d 964. 977 (9th Cir.2000)
(holding that the Brecht harmless error standard
applies in ail federal habeas corpus cases under

S
)
.
We cannot adequately evaluate the impact
of Hoffman's incriminating statements made
during the presentence interview without
considering the full body *541 of mitigating and
aggravating evidence considered at sentencing.
Hoffman's allegations of ineffective assistance
of counsel at the trial and sentencing cast doubt
over the reliability of this body of evidence; he
alleges that damaging information would have
been excluded and beneficial information
admitted had he received effective assistance of
counsel. If Hoffman proves these allegations at
the ineffectiveness hearing, then Hoffman's
statements made during the presentence
interview, withoutthe benefit of counsel, may be
sufficiently damaging to constitute error. We
therefore remand the question whether the denial
of counsel at the presentence hearing constituted
"harmless error" based, in part, on relevant
evidence that may be developed at the hearing to
determine whether Hoffman was denied
effective assistance of counsel.
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IV.

Application of the "Heinous, Atrocious or
Cruel" Aggravating Factor
Hoffman alleges that during sentencing the
trial court relied upon an unconstitutionally
vague aggravating factor, "that the murder was
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel,
rnanifestingexceptionaldepravity." Idaho Code
4 19-2515ChX5). Hoffman contends that the
Idaho Supreme Court's construction of this
factor fails to narrow sufficientlythe sentencer's
discretion as required by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. He asserts that the
"heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating factor
fails to pass constitutional muster for the same
reasons that the United States Supreme Court
found Oklahoma's "especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" aggravating factor invalid in
Maynard v. Carlwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363-64,
108 S.Ct. 1853,lOO L.Ed.2d 372 (1 988L We do
not reach the merits of this claim because we
conclude that the trial court's consideration of
the challenged sentencing factor would
constitute harmless error, assuming that the
factor is unconstitutional.
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weighing or non-weighing statuteY2
Generally, in states with non-weighing schemes,
reviewing courts may affirm the sentence if
other valid aggravating factors remain. See
Williams v. Calderon. 52 F.3d 1465. 1477 (9th
Cir. 1995); c$ Tuegle v. Netherland, 516 U.S.
10, 13-14, 116 S.Ct. 283, 133 L.Ed.2d 251
(clarifying that this rule does not permit
affirmance in cases where the constitutional taint
of the illegitimate factor infects the other
factors). A court reviewing a sentence imposed
under a weighing scheme must conduct
constitutional harmless-error analysis or require
a reweighing.
See Williams, 52 F.3d at
1 A77 FN26

FN25.A weighing statute requires the
decision maker to weigh the mitigating
evidence against the statutory
aggravators in order to impose the death
penalty; a non-weighing statute requires
a threshold finding of an aggravator and
then instructs the decision-maker to
weigh all relevant evidence. See, e.g.,
Zanl v. Ste~hens.462 U.S. 862.879.103
S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983).

FN26.In contrast, "when the sentencing

12711281 The appropriate remedy for reliance
upon an unconstitutional aggravating factor
depends in part on whether the state statute is a

body is told to weigh an invalid factor in
its decision, a reviewing court may not
assume it would have made no
difference if the thumb had been
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removed from death's side of the scale."
Stringer, 503 U.S. at 232. 112 S.Ct.
1130.
At the time of Hoffman's conviction, the Idaho
death penalty statute required the sentencing
court to weigh the aggravating circumstances
against the mitigating circumstances. See
Williams, 52 F.3d at 1478n. 13 ("Idaho has been
treated as a weighing state because of the
explicit procedural constraint."); Beam v.
Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301, 1310 n. 10,overruled on
other grounds by Lambrigkt v. Stewurt 191
F.3d 1181 (9th Cir.1999;) (noting that Idaho
statuterequires courts to weigheach aggravating
factor against all mitigating factors). We
therefore apply harmless-error analysis and ask
whether the allegedly invalid aggravating factor
had a "substantial *542 and injurious effect or
influence" on the court's determination.
Williams. 52 F.3d at 1476.
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conclude that any error that arose from the
court's consideration of the heinous, atrocious
and cruel aggravating factor did not affect the
court's determination, and constitutes harmless
error.

Hoffman's Claim That the Jury Should
Determine the Presence of Aggravating
Circumstances
GOULD, Circuit Judge, with whom W.
FLETCHER, Circuit Judge, concurs:
We concur in Judge Pregerson's opinion as to
Parts I through IV. However, we deliver the
opinion of the court as to Part V.

1291Hoffman argues that in light ofAprendi v.
The trial court in Hoffman's case independently
weighed the mitigating evidence against two
statutory aggravating circumstances: one, the
unchallenged circumstance,the victim's status as
a potential witness in a legal proceeding, and
two, the challenged heinous, atrocious, and cruel
circumstance. SeeIdaho Code S 19-2515(11)151
and (10). The, court determined that each
aggravating circumstance, standing alone,
outweighed the mitigating evidence. We

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348. 147
L.Ed.2d 435 (20001, Idaho's capital sentencing
statute unconstitutionally deprives him of the
right to have a jury-rather than a
judge-determine the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, a determination that could result
in a sentence of death. In Apprendi, the Supreme
Court announced a general rule that "any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
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reasonable doubt." Id. at 2362-63. Hoffman
contends that the presence of an aggravating
circumstance should be treated as an element of
a capital case to be decided by the jury rather
than as a factor in sentence enhancement to be
decided by the judge.
In Walton v. Arizona, the Supreme Court
addressed a similar sentencing scheme and held
that the presence of an aggravating circumstance
in a capital case may constitutionally be
determined by a judge rather than a jury. 497
U.S. 639.647-48. 110 S.Ct. 3047.11 1 L.Ed.2d
5 11 (1990). The Supreme Court in Apprendi did
not overrule Walton. It wrote:
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overruled Walton, and that one concurring
Justice stated that Walton could be reexamined
on "another day." But while Apprendi may raise
some doubt about Walton, it is not our place to
engage in anticipatory overruling. The Supreme
Court has specifically directed lower courts to
"leav[e] to this Court the prerogative of
overruling its own decisions." Agostini v.
Felton. 521 U.S. 203,207, 117 S.Ct. 1997,138
L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) (citing Rodriguezde Ouiias
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.. 490 U.S.
477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526
We therefore conclude that Walton
forecloses Hoffman's Apprendi-based challenge
to Idaho's capital sentencing scheme.

m).

VI.
Finally, this Court has previously considered
and rejected the argument that the principles
guiding our decision today render invalid state
capital sentencing schemes requiring judges,
after a jury verdict holding a defendant guilty
of a capital crime, to find specific aggravating
factors before imposing a sentence of death.

AD-~rendi.120 S.Ct. at 2366 (citing Walton,497
U.S. at 647-49, 110 S.Ct. 3047: Id at 709-14,
110 S.Ct. 3047 (Stevens, J. dissenting)).
We are aware that four dissenting Justices in
Apprendi asserted that Apprendi effectively

CONCLUSION

We REMAND to the district court for an
evidentiary hearing on petitioner's
ineffective"543 assistance of counsel claims in
accordance with this opinion. WeREVERSE the
district court's ruling
- that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments did not apply to petitioner's
presentence interview, and defer -judgment
khether the denial of counsel during petitioner's
presentence interview constitutesharmless error
until after the ineffective assistance of counsel
hearing. We AFFIRM the district court's denial
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of all other claims.
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring
separately in the result of Part V:
I respectfully disagree with the majority's
conclusion that Walton forecloses Hoffman's
Apprendi-based challenge to Idaho's capital
sentencing scheme.
The specific question whether the presence of an
aggravating circumstance in a capital case is a
matter to be determined by a jury was answered
in the negative by the Supreme Court in
v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639. 110 S.Ct. 3047. 111
L.Ed.2d 51 1 (19901, which was decided ten
years before Appvendi.
Resolution of
Hoffman's claim thus requires consideration of
the present viability of Walfon in light of
Apprendi, and analysis ofwhether the holding of
Apprendi extends to the determination of an
aggravating circumstance under Idaho's capital
sentencing scheme.
Idaho arguesthat Hoffman's Apprendi claim was
procedurally defaulted because he failed to
exhaust this claim in state court, or alternatively,
that requiring a jury to determine the presence of
the statutory aggravating circumstance would
impose a new rule in violation of Teague.
Although the Apprendi claim may have been
procedurally defaulted,fN'7 Idaho's capital
appellate sentencing statute requires mandatory
review of the entire record for sentencing errors

by the Idaho Supreme Court. SeeIdaho Code $
19-2827; Beum v. Puskett, 3 F.3d 1301, 1306
(1993'), overruled on other grounds by
Lambripht v. Stewart. 191 F.3d 1181 (9th
Cir. 1999). Sentencing errors are thus treated as
implicitly raised, removing the bar of procedural
default. Id As discussed below, I would find
that requiring a jury to determine beyond a
reasonable doubt the presence of aggravating
circumstances in a capital case constitutesa new
rule. I would conclude, however, that it falls
within one of the two exceptions to the Teague
non-retroactivity doctrine and would therefore
consider the Apprendi claim on the merits.

FN27.Hoffman filed a

motion before
sentencing with the trial court to "have a
jury empaneled for the purpose of
sentencing, or in the alternative, to serve
in an advisory capacity to the trial
court." See State ofIdaho v. Hoffman,
123 Idaho 638, 643. 851 P.2d 934
(1993'). The trial court denied the
motion, and Hoffman appealed the
denial in his consolidated appeal to the
Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The Idaho
Supreme Court ruled that the Idaho
Constitution does not require that a jury
rather than ajudge determine sentencing.
Id. Because Hoffman appears to have
raised the right to a jury trial on state
constitutional grounds alone, the federal
grounds arguably were defaulted.
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A. Idaho's First Degree Murder Statute
Before 1977, Idaho law imposed the death
penalty for all first degree murder convictions.
SeeIdaho Code 6 18-4004 (1976) ("[elvery
person guilty of murder in the first degree shall
suffer death"). After the Supreme Court
invalidated North Carolina's mandatory death
penalty statute in Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978. 49 L.Ed.2d 944
/1976), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the
Idaho first degree murder statute was
unconstitutional. See State v. Lindauist. 99
Idaho 766, 768, 589 P.2d 101 (1979) (noting
that the Idaho statute was "virtually identical" to
the North Carolina statute). The Idaho
legislature responded to Woodson by making
two critical statutory changes: first, the
legislature changed the language of 3 18-4004to
allow for the option of death or life
imprisonment;
second, the legislature"544
amended 3 18-4004 to incorporate a new
statutory section. Under this new section, $
19-2515, the trial judge, before the death penalty
can be imposed, is required to find the presence
of a statutory aggravating circumstance and then
determine that the aggravating circumstance
outweighs any mitigating evidence. See id

FN28.The amended statute remains the
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same today. SeeIdaho Code 6 18-4004
("Punishment for murder. Subject to the
provisions of 3 19-2515, Idaho Code,
every person guilty of murder of the first
degree shall be punished by death or by
imprisonment for life.").
As a result of the 1977 statutory changes, a
capital defendant's conviction and imposition of
the death sentence by the judge occur in two
stages. First, Idaho must obtain a first degree
murder conviction from the jury by proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed one of the crimes enumerated in
Idaho Code 6 18-4003(a-Q.E Second, thejury
having found the defendant guilty of first degree
murder, the ,judge must hold a separate
sentencing hearing. Based on the evidence
presented at the hearing, the judge must: (1) find
beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of
ten enumerated aggravating circumstances is
present; and then (2) determine that the
aggravating circumstance(s) outweigh($ any
mitigating evidence. If the state fails to persuade
the trial judge beyond a reasonable doubt of the
existence of an aggravating circumstance, the
defendant cannot be sentenced to death. Idaho
Code 6 19-25151h). "Where a person is
convicted of an offense which may be
punishable by death, a sentence of death shall
not be imposed unless the court finds at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance." &&Q
Code 6 19-2515(fl.
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FN29. Idaho Code 6 18-4003 defines the
following offenses as first degree
murder: murder perpetrated by means of
poison, lying in wait, torture; murder
perpetrated by willful, deliberate and
premeditated killing; murder of any
peace officer, executive officer, officer
of the court, fireman, judicial officer or
prosecuting attorney; murder committed
by a person under a sentence for murder
of the first or second degree; murder
committed in the perpetration of or
attempt to perpetrate, aggravated battery
on a child under 12 years of age, arson,
rape, robbery, burglary, kidnaping or
mayhem; any murder committed by a
person incarcerated in a penal institution
upon a person employed by the penal
institution, another inmate of the penal
institution or a visitor to the penal
institution; any murder committed by a
person while escaping or attempting to
escape from a penal institution. Idaho
Code 6 18-4003(a)-(Q.

In accordance with its statutory scheme, Idaho
charged Hoffman with first degree murder on
the ground that the murder was perpetrated by
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.
SeeIdaho Code 6 18-4003(a). The jury returned
a verdict of guilty on the first degree murder
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charge. The trial judge then conducted a
sentencing hearing without a jury, at which
witnesses and the defendant testified. The judge
found the presence of two statutory aggravating
circumstances in Hoffman's case, determined
that they outweighed the mitigating evidence,
and imposed the death sentence.

B. Appvendi v. New Jersey
The Supreme Court in Apprendi considered a
challenge to a New Jersey hate crime statute.
The statute required the trial judge to determine
at sentencing if the crime was motivated by "a
purpose to intimidate an individual or group of
individuals because of race, color, gender,
handicap, religion, sexual orientation or
ethnicity." Anpvendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2351 (quoting
N.J. Stat. Ann. 5 2C: 44-3(e) West Supp.2000).
If the court made such a statutory finding, it
could impose an "expanded" prison term. Id.
The hate crime statute thus permitted the judge
to impose an additional term of imprisonment
beyond the maximum sentence prescribed for
the offense for which the defendant was
convicted. Id.
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court
characterized the hate crime enhancement as a
"sentencing factor," the SupremeCourt held that
the enhancement "545 was an element of the
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offense, which should have been considered by
the jury. Id at 2353, 2363.""
The Supreme
Court concluded that all facts which increase the
penalty beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be found by a jury to exist
beyond a reasonable doubt.?
Id. at 2363 ("It
is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove
from the jury the assessment of facts that
increase the prescribed range of penalties to
which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is
equally clear that such facts must be established
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.") (quoting
Jones. 526 U.S. at 252-53, 119 S.Ct. 1215
(Stevens, J. concurring)).

FN30. Apprendi

extended the Court's
previous ruling in.Jones v. Unitedstates,
526 U.S. 227. 119 S.Ct. 1215. 143
L.Ed.2d 3 11 (1 999). In Jones, the Court
held that the provisions of a federal car
jacking statute that permitted the
imposition of greater penalties are
elements of the offense, and require a
jury to determine the underlying facts.
See Jones, 526 U.S. at 252. 119 S.Ct.
1215.The Court found that a contrary
interpretation would raise constitutional
questions, because the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments require submission to the
jury of facts that increase the punishment
beyond that authorized by the statute. Id.
at240-49. 119 S.Ct. 1215.
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FN31.The Supreme Court qualified this
holding by declining to overrule
Almendarez-Torres v. Unitedstates. 523
U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d
350 (1998). Apprendi. 120 S.Ct. at2355.
In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme
Court considered the statutory scheme
for sentencing aliens once deported who
return to the United States without
permission. Although the general penalty
for violating the applicable statute is two
years of incarceration, the statute
authorizes an additional prison term of
up to twenty years for aliens who were
removed subsequent to a felony
conviction. Alrnendarez-Torres, 523
U.S. at 226, 118 S.Ct. 1219. The
Supreme Court found that the provision
authorizing the additional prison term
was a penalty provision, rather than a
separate crime, and therefore concluded
that the indictment did not need to list
the prior conviction as an element of the
offense. Id The Supreme Court
described this holding as "at best, an
exceptional departure." AD-prendi,120
S.Ct. at 2361. In Apprendi, the Court
noted that "it is arguable that
Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly
decided," and stressed the fact that the
petitioner in Alrnendarez-Torres did not
contest the underlying convictions. Id.
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The Supreme Court provided clear instructions
for distinguishing sentencing factors from
elements of an offense: "the relevant inquiry is
not one of form, but of effect-does the required
finding expose the defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury's
guilty verdict?" Id. at 2365. The Court applied
the test to the New Jersey hate crime statute, and
found that the hate crime enhancement turned a
second degree offense into a first degree offense.
Id.
Under Idaho's death penalty scheme, a defendant
is not actually "death-eligible" after a jury
convicts him of first degree rnurder.2 Rather,
at the conclusion of the first degree murder
conviction, the defendant is only eligible for a
sentence of life imprisonment. Idaho Code 3
19-2515(c). The defendant is not death-eligible
until the trial judge finds the presence of an
aggravating circumstance. Id. If the trial judge
finds an aggravating circumstance, the judge
then has the task of weighing the statutory
aggravating circumstance against all of the
mitigating evidence to determine if the
defendant should receive life in prison or the
death penalty. Id.

FN32. As discussed earlier, the first
degree murder conviction alone does not
sufficiently guide the discretion of the
sentencer to allow for the imposition of
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the death penalty. See, e.g.,State v.
Lindquisf; see also Woodson v. North
Carolina. 428 U.S. 280. 303, 96 S.Ct.
2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976)("North
Carolina's mandatory death penalty
statute provides no standards to guide
the jury in its inevitable exercise of the
power to determine which first-degree
murderers shall live and which shall
die.")
Just as the presence of the hate crime
enhancement transformed a second degree
offense sentence into a first degree offense
sentence under the New Jersey hate crime
statute, the presence of an aggravating
circumstance here transforms a life sentence into
a potential death sentence under the Idaho death
penalty scheme. There can be no doubt that a
death sentence is "546 an increased penalty
beyond life imprisonment.It is equally clear that
the presence or absence of an aggravating
circumstance is a factual determination. I would
therefore conclude that the determination of the
presence or absence of an aggravating
circumstance in a capital case is a factual
determination that increases the potential
sentence from life imprisonment to capital
punishment, and thus must be submitted to the
jury under Apprendi. By allowing the judge to
determine facts that increased the potential
penalty from life imprisonment to death, &&Q
Code 6 19-2515 deprived Hoffman of his right
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to a jury trial in violation of the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
C. Walton v. Arizona
The Supreme Court rejected a similar challenge
to the trial judge's role in a state capital
sentencing scheme in Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S.639.649,IlOS.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d511
(1990')?U33
In Walton, the Court held
constitutional a statutory scheme in Arizona that
permitted the trial judge, rather than a jury, to
find the presence of aggravating circumstances.
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the
presence of aggravating circumstances
functioned as a necessary element of a death
sentence and required a jury trial. See
709. 110 S.Ct. 3047 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

FN33. The

Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Walton because the Ninth
Circuit ruled en banc in Adamson v.
Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (19881, that the
A r i z o n a d e a t h penalty was
unconstitutional on the same grounds
asserted by Walton. See Walton, 497
U.S. at 647, 110 S.Ct. 3047.

The Supreme Court in Apprendi was divided
over whether Walton survives Apprendi. The
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majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens and
joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsburg, distinguished Walton from Apprendi.
See Awrendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2366. The majority
opinion in Apprendi, referring to Walton,
suggested that under the bifurcated Arizona
scheme, the defendant was "death-eligible" once
the jury found him guilty of first degree murder.
Id. (describing Walton as holding that "once a
jury has found the defendant guilty of all the
elements of an offense which carries as its
maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may
be left to the judge to decide whether that
maximum penalty, rather than a lesser one,
ought t o be imposed") (quoting
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 257, n. 2, 118
S.Ct. 1219. (Scalia, J. dissenting)).
The concurring opinion of Justice Thomas
acknowledged the tension between Walton and
Apprendi, but found that it was "a question for
another day." See id at 2380.
Dissenting Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist,
Kennedy, and Breyer argued that Apprendi
directly conflicts with Walton:
The distinction of Walton offered by the Court
today is baffling, to say the least. The key to
that distinction is the Court's claim that, in
Arizona, the jury maltes all of the findings
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necessary to expose the defendant to a death
sentence. As explained above, that claim is
demonstrably untrue. A defendant convicted
of first-degree murder in Arizona cannot
receive a death sentence unless a judge makes
the factual determination that a statutory
aggravating factor exists. Without that critical
finding, the maximum sentence to which the
defendant is exposed is life imprisonment, and
not the death penalty.
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unconstitutional for a legislature to
remove from the jury the assessment of
facts that increase the prescribed range
of penalties] encompasses ... facts that
must be established before a defendant
may be put to death." Jones. 526 U.S.
at 253, 119 S.Ct. 1215. Justice Stevens
continued, "[ilf ... the Court's opinion in
Walton v. Arizona departed from that
principle, as I think [it] did, [it] should
be reconsidered in due course." Id.
(internal citations omitted).

Id. at 2388 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal
citations omitted).
Thus, it appears that four justices considered
Waltonto surviveApprendi,z one *547 justice
deferred the question, and four justices
expressed the view that Apprendi overruled
Walton. In the absence of a majority position
about the continued viability of Walton, I turn
for guidance to the Court's reasoning in
Apprendi.
Included in this count is Justice
Stevens, the author of Apprendi. It is
questionable, however, whether Justice
Stevens considers Walton still good law,
given his concurring opinion in Jones v.
Unitedstates. In Jones, Justice Stevens
explained that "in [his] view, a proper
understanding of this principle [that it is

The reasoning of Apprendi, that any assessment
of facts that increases the maximum penalty
must be submittedto the jury and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt, persuades me that a jury
must find the presence of an aggravating
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt before
a death sentence can be inflicted upon a
defendant convicted of first degree murder under
Idaho's bifurcated statutory scheme.

D. The Teague Non-Retroactivity Exception
for Watershed Rules of Criminal Procedure
Apprendi, and its precursor, Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227. 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143
L.Ed.2d 3 11 (19991, were both decided after
Hoffman's conviction became final. Under
Teague, Hoffman, as a petitioner in a federal
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habeas proceeding, cannot receive the benefit of
a new rule of law unless the rule falls within one
of two exceptions. The requirement that the jury
rather than the trial judge determine the presence
of a statutoty aggravating factor in a capital case
before a death sentence can be imposed is a new
rule of law which cannot be applied to this case
unless the rule falls within one of the two
Teague exceptions.
The Supreme Court in Teague recognized an
exception, frequently referred to as the "second
exception," relevant in this case, for "those
watershed rules of criminal procedure" that
"alter our understanding of the bedrock
procedural elements essential to the fairness of
a proceeding." Sawver v. Smith. 497 U.S. 227,
242, 1 I0 S.Ct. 2822. 1 1 1 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990)
(quoting Teague )
!E Thus, the question in
Hoffman's case is whether extending Apprendi
to the determination of an aggravating
circumstance in a death penalty case constitutes
a fundamental rule of criminal procedure
sufficient to satisf) the second exception.

FN35.

The Court described two
categorical exceptions in Teague: (1)
rules that place primary individual
conduct outside of the power of criminal
law to proscribe, and (2) watershed rules
of criminal procedure. Teame, 489
U.S. at 307, 109 S.Ct. 1060. The

"watershed rules of criminal procedure"
is thus sometimes referred to as the
"second exception" to Teague.
Since the Supreme Court decided Teague a
decade ago, federal courts have struggled to
discern the meaning of this second exception.
See Safflev. Parks. 494 U.S. 484.495.110 S.Ct.
1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990) ("[Tlhe precise
contours of this exception may be difficult to
discern."); Gaines v. Kellv, 202 F.3d 598. 604
(2d Cir.20001 (describing the scope of the
second exception as a "difficult question"
unaided by the "relatively sparse guidance" of
the Supreme Court). Despite ambiguity over the
definition, courts have applied the second
exception to a range of constitutional rules of
See, ee.g., Ostroskv v.
criminal procedure.
Alaska, 913 F.2d 590. 594-95 (9th Cir.19901
(announcing a new due process rule concerning
mistake of law defenses and finding that the rule
falls within the Teague exception for
"procedures implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty"); Hall v. Kelso. 892.F.2d 1541, 1543 n.
1 (1 1th Cir.1990) (finding as an exception the
rule announced in Sandstrom v. Montana
regarding burden shifting instructions); Graham
v. Hoke, 946 F.2d 982, 994 (2d Cir.1991)
(finding as an exception the rule announced in
Cruz, that non testifying codefendant's
confession may not be admitted); Williams v.
Dixon. 961 F.2d 448. 454-56 (4th Cir.1992)
(finding as an exception the Mills rule striking
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the unanimity requirement in jury findings of
mitigating evidence); *548Gaines. 202 F.3d at
604 (finding as an exception the Cage rule that
describing reasonable doubt in terms of grave or
substantial uncertainty and requiring a "moral
certainty" violates due process).

I would find that the issue at stake in this
case-the right to have ajury determine facts that
increase the potential penalty from life
imprisonment to death-is the kind of
fundamental rule of criminal procedure that
should be applied retroactively under the second
Teague exception. The Supreme Court
announced in Apprendi that "[alt stalte in this
case are constitutional protections of surpassing
importance." Apprendi, 120 S.Ct. at 2355. The
Court characterized the right to a jury trial of
every element of the offense and the standard of
proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, as "basic
principles" of our legal system, noting

there is a vast difference between accepting
the validity of a prior judgment of conviction
entered in aproceeding in which the defendant
had the right to a jury trial and the right to
require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to
find the required fact under a lesser standard
of proof.
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Id. at 2359,2366.
I would adhere to the Supreme Court's
characterization of the rule at stake in Apprendi
and find that the right to a jury determination of
an element of capital murder, the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, is a "bedrock right"
within the meaning of the second Teague
exception. I would thus apply the rule
announced in Apprendi to Hoffman's case and
find that he was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment due process right to a jury trial
when the trial judge, rather than the jury, found
the presence of the statutory aggravating
circumstances, necessary to the impositionofthe
death penalty.

E. Harmless Error
Although I conclude that Idaho Statute 2
19-2515 unconstitutionally requires the judge
rather than the jury to find the presence of
aggravating circumstances, the error appears
harmless in Hoffman's case. See Satterwhite,
486 U.S. at 256, 108 S.Ct. 1792. The error is
harmless unless the trialjudge's determination of
the presence of the aggravating circumstance
had a "substantial and injurious effect" on
Hoffman's sentence. See Bains, 204 F.3d at
964.
-
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The trial judge found that the aggravating
circumstance, that the victim was a witness or a
potential witness in a legal proceeding, was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. At no point
during the trial, sentencing proceeding, or appeal
process has Hoffman contested that the victim
was a witness or potential witness.
Given the fact that there is no dispute that the
aggravating circumstance was present, I would
not find that Hoffman's sentence was adversely
affected by the fact that the trial judge, rather
than the jury, made this determination.
Accordingly, I would conclude that the trial
judge's determination of the presence of the
aggravating circumstance in this case is
harmless error.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART
AND REMANDED.
C.A.9 (Idaho),2001.
Hoffman v. Arave
236F.3d 523,01 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 107,2001
Daily Journal D.A.R. 159
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